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Grave Crimes and Weak Evidence: A Fact-finding
Evolution in International Criminal Law
Nancy Amoury Combs*
International criminal courts carry out some of the most important work that a legal system can
conduct: prosecuting those who hav visited death and destruction on millions. Despite the significance of
their work-or perhaps because of it-international courts face tremendous challenges. Chief among them
is accurate fact-finding. With alarming regularity, international criminal trials feature inconsistent,
vague, and sometimes false testimony that renders judges unable to assess with any measure of certainty
who did what to whom in the context of a mass atrocity. This Article provides the first-ever empirical
study quantifying fact-finding in an international criminal court. The study shines a spotlight both on
the testimonial deficiencies that impede accurate fact-finding and on the judges' assessments of deficient
witness testimony. Although my previous work on fact-finding has been generally critical of international
criminal courts, this large-scale empirical study provides far more reason for optimism This study reveals
a host of interesting and sometimes unexpected findings. Taken as a whole, however, it depicts a criminal
justice system that labors in the face of severe fact-finding challenges hut that has, over the years, appropri-
ately altered its fact-finding practices to respond to those challenges.
1. INTRODUCTION
International courts that prosecute crimes such as genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity have provided human rights advocates with a
novel and potentially powerful enforcement tool. These courts have achieved
many notable successes in the twenty years since the first modern tribunal
was created.' The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), for
instance, has played a vital role in developing the law of genocide 2 and the
prohibition of sexual violence in international criminal law.' The Interna-
* Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I owe tremendous thanks to
Eric Kades, who performed the statistical analyses described in this paper and also provided extraordina-
rily helpful editorial comments. For early feedback, I am grateful to Kristen Boon, Evan Criddle,
Shahram Dana, Ashley Deeks, Meg deGuzman, Adil Haque, Saira Mohamed, Yvonne McDermott Rees,
Daryl Robinson, James Stewart, Jenia Turner, and Alex Whiting. Finally, this Article benefited from
excellent research assistance provided by Mary Antley, Daniel Biegler, James Damon, Sarah Deuitch, and
Caroline Lochabay. Any errors are my own.
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is considered the first inter-
national criminal tribunal of the modern era.
2. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat.
v. Serb.), para. 36 (Feb. 3, 2015) (separate opinion of Judge Bhandari), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/152/18860.pdf.
3. See THE INT'L CTR. FOR ETHICS, JUSTICE, AND PUB. LIFE, BRANDEIS UNIV., SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LEGACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA 18-25 (2010), http://
www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/LegacyofCICTRinAfricaICEJPL.pdf, see generally
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Contribution of the ICTR to the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFRICA (Charles C. Jalloh &
Alhagi B.M. Marong eds., 2015).
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tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), for their parts, made history by indicting
sitting heads of state,4 whereas the SCSL and the International Criminal
Court (ICC) have issued ground-breaking decisions involving the enlistment
and conscription of child soldiers.' In addition to these successes, however,
international criminal courts and tribunals have also faced a multitude of
challenges. International criminal tribunals must contend with obstruction-
ist defendants who seek to delay and distort proceedings,6 insufficient budg-
ets that require them to pit fairness against efficiency,7 and recalcitrant
governments that refuse to surrender indictees,* evidence, 9 and witnesses.10
Additionally, and equally pressingly, international criminal tribunals
must contend with a host of factors that impede their ability to find accurate
facts. Many of these factors have been on embarrassing display lately at the
4. EDWARD M. WISE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 397 (3rd ed.
2009).
5. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack ofJurisdiction (May 31, 2004); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment
pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, paras. 478-84 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2012_03942.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment].
6. For a description of the disruptive tactics perpetrated by two of the most notorious obstructionist
defendants, Slobodan Milogevi6 and Vojislav egelj, see Nancy A. Combs, Legitimizing International Crimi-
nalustice: The Importance of Process Control, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 321, 348-53 (2012). See also Devon
Whittle, Frivolous Motions and Abuses of Process at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 22 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 16-19, 27 (2013) (describing defense motions that were intended to delay
proceedings or disturb "the fair and expeditious conduct of the trial"); Press Release, ICC, Bemba Case:
Four Suspects Arrested for Corruptly Influencing Witnesses; Same Charges Served on Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (Nov. 24, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.intlen-menusliccpress%20and%20medialpress% 2Ore
leases/Pages/pr962.aspx (describing charges of offenses against the administration of justice brought
against the defendant and his lawyers for allegedly "corruptly influencing witnesses before the ICC and
presenting evidence that they knew to be false or forged").
7. See, e.g., Sara Kendall, Marketing Accountability at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY 387, 403-05 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014); AARON
FICHTELBERG, HYBRID TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE ExAMINATION 44 (2015); Georgia/Russia: ICC
Judges OK Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/geor-
gia/russia-icc-judges-ok-investigation; Public Hearing on Serbia's Non-Compliance Slated for Next Week,
SENSE NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/public-hearing-on-serbia's-non-
compliance-slated-for-next-week.29.html?newsid= 16952; David Cohen, SeekingJustice on the Cheap: Is
the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, 61 ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES 1, 3, 5 (2002), http://
www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apiO6l.pdf; NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT
FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 274
n.1176 (2010) [hereinafter FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS) (providing sources discussing the ICTY's
and ICTR's underfunding).
8. See, e.g., Press Release, ICC, ICC Prosecutor's Statement to the United Nations Security Council on
the Situation in Darfur UNSCR 1593 (2005) (June 5, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/
item.aspx?name=PR803 (describing Sudan's failure to surrender indicted President Omar al-Bashir);
Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situa-
tion in Libya pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011) (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/in-
dex.php?id=13377 (discussing Libya's failure to surrender Saif Gaddafi); Cohen, supra note 7, at 7
(discussing Indonesia's refusal to turn over Special Panels for Serious Crimes indictees).
9. See ICC Drops Uhuru Kenyatta Charges for Kenya Ethnic Violence, BBC (Dec. 5, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019.
10. See KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 140
(2005) (describing Rwanda's refusal to permit ICTR witnesses to leave Rwanda).
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ICC. There, judges have already refused to confirm charges against several
suspects," have acquitted one of the court's first four defendants,12 and have
sharply scolded prosecutors for the evidentiary deficiencies in their cases."
Fact-finding impediments have never been a more serious problem in inter-
national criminal law.
In previous works, I brought to light a wide range of deficiencies com-
mon to eyewitness testimony in international criminal tribunals. 4 This Ar-
ticle dramatically expands that previous research and breaks new ground by
providing quantitative assessments of two phenomena that are vitally im-
portant to accurate fact-finding. First, this Article presents a quantitatlve
analysis of the testimonial deficiency in international criminal trials that is
both most prevalent and that has the greatest potential to impair accurate
fact-finding: inconsistencies between witnesses' current testimony and their
previous representations. Second, because testimonial deficiencies tell only
part of the story of international criminal fact-finding, this Article quantita-
tively explores another, even more crucial part: the Trial Chambers' treat-
ment of witness testimony. I explore these issues through an empirical
analysis of 342 prosecution witnesses who testified before the ICTR over the
course of that Tribunal's life.
Part II explains my research focus and my methodology. Part III details
my findings on inconsistencies. To set the stage, I explain here what these
inconsistencies are and how they arise. Before persons appear at an interna-
tional criminal tribunal to testify for the prosecution, they tell their story at
least once and often multiple times. At the very least, a prospective witness
tells her story to a tribunal investigator who drafts a written statement,
ostensibly containing the information that the prospective witness conveyed.
Some prospective witnesses are interviewed multiple times and give multi-
ple pre-trial statements. Additionally, some witnesses testify in multiple
11. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges (Feb. 8, 2010); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Con-
firmation of Charges (Dec. 16, 2011); Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Art. 6 1(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, para. 425 (Jan. 23,
2012); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to
Art. 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, para. 293 (Jan. 23, 2012).
12. Defendants Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, and Jean-Pierre Bemba, were convicted, see
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 5, para. 1358; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG,
Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, 658-59 (Mar. 7, 2014) (hereinafter Katanga Judgment];
Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, 364 (Mar.
21, 2016), whereas Mathieu Ngudjolo was acquitted, see Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-
tENG, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, 197 (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Ngudjolo
Judgment].
13. See Ngudjolo Judgment, supra note 12, paras. 115-123; Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An
Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of ICC Investigations, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 1, 4, 19-21
(2014); see also Alex Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives at the International Criminal Court,
in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 140 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 2015)
(noting that in both judgments issued to date "the judges set aside considerable parts of the prosecution's
evidence, finding that it lacked sufficient credibility").
14. See infra text accompanying notes 28 and 29.
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cases about the same set of events, so, by the time these witnesses testify for
the prosecution, they have already testified under oath either before another
Trial Chamber or before another court entirely. Inconsistencies arise when a
witness's testimony diverges from the representations that appear in the wit-
ness's pre-trial statements or previous testimonies.
These sorts of inconsistencies are by no means confined to testimony
before the ICTR. My previous research found such inconsistencies to be a
prevalent feature of witness testimony in all of the international criminal
tribunals I studied, and they pertain to a whole range of topics relevant to
the disposition of the trial. Some inconsistencies center on such details as
dates, distances, duration, and numbers," whereas others concern central
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, para. 236 (June 1, 2001)
(hereinafter Akayesu Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment paras.
403, 412-13 (June 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-01-64-T, Judgment, para. 123
(June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T,
Judgment, para. 680 (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case
No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, paras. 327, 339 (Jan. 22, 2004); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-
01-74-T, Judgment, paras. 116, 164, 226-28, 299 (Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Karera Judgment); Prose-
cutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, paras. 269-270 (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter
Muhimana Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, paras. 385-87 (Jan.
27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema Judgment); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Judg-
ment, para. 171 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Muvunyi Judgment); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No.
ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment, paras. 59-60, 65, 99, 102, 167, 277-78, 306 (May 16, 2003) (hereinafter
Niyitegeka Judgment]; Prosecutor v. de Jesus, Case No. 06/2002, Judgment, at 10-11 (Jan. 28, 2004)
(hereinafter Paulino de Jesus Judgment); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment,
para. 171 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, paras. 167, 169,
382 (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Simba Judgment}; Transcript of Continued Trial at 56, 59-60, Prose-
cutor v. Bagosora (July 3, 2003) (ICTR-98-41-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 9, 22, 30, Prosecutor
v. Bagosora (July 2, 2003) (ICTR-98-41-T) [hereinafter Military I Transcript, July 2, 20031; Transcript
of Continued Trial at 43, 44, 46, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi (Aug. 6, 2003) (ICTR 01-64-T); Transcript
of Continued Trial at 62-65, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda (Sept. 19, 2001) (ICTR-99-54A-T) [hereinafter
Kamuhanda Transcript, Sept. 19, 2001); Transcript of Continued Trial at 29-3 1, Prosecutor v. Kamu-
handa (Sept. 4, 2002) (ICTR-99-54A-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 17-18, 20, Prosecutor v.
Karemera (Dec. 5, 2003) (ICTR-98-44-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 9-10, Prosecutor v. Karera
(Jan. 31, 2006) (ICTR-01-74-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 43-45, Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Apr.
19, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T) (hereinafter Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 19, 2004); Transcript of Continued
Trial at 4, 18-19, Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Mar. 31, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T); Transcript of Continued
Trial at 12, 22-23, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi (Sept. 22, 2003) (ICTR-01-71-T); Transcript of Contin-
ued Trial at 25-35, 60-61, Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko (Mar. 20, 2003) (ICTR-98-42-T); Transcript
of Trial at 45-46, Prosecutor v. Brima (Sept. 19, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 96,
Prosecutor v. Brima (July 26, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T) [hereinafter AFRC Transcript, July 26, 20051;
Transcript of Trial at 82-83, 96, Prosecutor v. Brima (July 21, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T) [hereinafter AFRC
Transcript, July 21, 20051; Transcript of Trial at 85, Prosecutor v. Brima (July 12, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-
T); Transcript of Trial at 151-52, Prosecutor v. Brima (July 11, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T) [hereinafter
AFRC Transcript, July 11, 2005]; Transcript of Trial at 122-23, Prosecutor v. Brima Uune 30, 2005)
(SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 132-35, Prosecutor v. Brima (June 23, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T)
[hereinafter AFRC Transcript, June 23, 2005]; Transcript of Trial at 26-27, 47-48, Prosecutor v. Brima
(June 22, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 53-64, Prosecutor v. Brima (June 21, 2005)
(SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 21-25, Prosecutor v. Brima (Apr. 20, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T);
Transcript of Trial at 52-59, Prosecutor v. Brima (Apr. 19, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at
34-38, 38-39, 53-60, 63-65, 67-69, Prosecutor v. Brima (Apr. 12, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript
of Trial at 79, Prosecutor v. Brima (Apr. 8, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 24-27, Prose-
cutor v. Brima (Apr. 6, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Transcript of Trial at 45, Prosecutor v. Norman (Mar. 8,
2005) (SCSL-04-14-T); Transcript of Trial 14-19, 24-28, Prosecutor v. Norman (Mar. 4, 2005) (SCSL-
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aspects of the crime1 6 and/or the defendant's involvement in the crime.17
Sometimes, a witness's statement will inculpate the defendant when her tes-
timony does not, and sometimes it is the witness's testimony that inculpates
when her statement does not." Finally, some witnesses testify about the
04-14-T); Transcript of Trial at 73-74, 91-104, Prosecutor v. Norman (Feb. 22, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T);
Transcript of Trial at 18, Prosecutor v. Norman (Feb. 9, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T) [hereinafter CDF Tran-
script, Feb. 9, 2005); Transcript of Trial at 80-81, Prosecutor v. Norman (Dec. 6, 2004) (SCSL-04-14-
T); Transcript of Trial at 101-03, Prosecutor v. Norman (Sept. 13, 2004) (SCSL-04-14-T); Transcript of
Trial at 85-87, Prosecutor v. Norman (Sept. 9, 2004) (SCSL-04-14-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at
54-55, Prosecutor v. Norman (June 21, 2004) (SCSL-04-14-PT) [hereinafter CDF Transcript, June 21,
2004]; Transcript of Trial at 3-4, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Mar. 31, 2006) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of
Trial at 29-30, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Nov. 22, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at 66-67,
Prosecutor v. Sesay (May 12, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T) [hereinafter RUF Transcript, May 12, 2005); Tran-
script of Trial at 91, 100, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Apr. 15, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at
27-33, 38-40, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Apr. 14, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at 138-40,
Prosecutor v. Sesay (Oct. 8, 2004) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 25-26, Prosecutor
v. Sesay (July 21, 2004) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at 9544, Prosecutor v. Taylor (May 12,
2008) (SCSL-03-01-T); Transcript of Trial at 6079, Prosecutor v. Taylor (Mar. 13, 2008) (SCSL-03-01-
T) (hereinafter Taylor Transcript, Mar. 13, 2008); Transcript of Trial at 3622-24, Prosecutor v. Taylor
(Feb. 12, 2008) (SCSL-03-01-T); Transcript of Trial at 758-59, Prosecutor v. Taylor (Jan. 8, 2008)
(SCSL-03-01-T) (hereinafter Taylor Transcript, Jan. 8, 2008]; Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring
Programme at 306, Prosecutor v. Marques (Sept. 28, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000) Case Notes of Judicial
System Monitoring Programme at 179, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 21, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000);
thereinafter Los Palos Case Notes, Aug. 21, 2001]; Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Pro-
gramme at 120, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 2, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000); Case Notes of Judicial System
Monitoring Programme at 109, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 1, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000); see generally
FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 106-07.
16. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial at 75-81, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana (Sept. 20, 2001) (ICTR 96-17-
T) (hereinafter Ntakirutimana Transcript, Sept. 20, 2011]; Transcript of Continued Trial at 31-40,
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda (Feb. 14, 2002) (ICTR-99-54A-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 48, Prose-
cutor v. Ndindabahizi (Sept. 29, 2003) (ICTR-01-71-T); AFRC Transcript, June 23, 2005, supra note
15, at 103-04; Transcript of Trial at 111-14, Prosecutor v. Brima (June 24, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T);
Transcript of Trial at 50, Prosecutor v. Brima (July 7, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); AFRC Transcript, July 26,
2005, supra note 15, at 97-98; Transcript of Trial at 63-72, Prosecutor v. Norman (Sept. 27, 2004)
(SCSL-04-14-T); CDF Transcript, Feb. 9, 2005, supra note 15, at 28; Transcript of Trial at 7-9, Prosecu-
tor v. Norman (Feb. 25, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T); RUF Transcript, May 12, 2005, supra note 15, at 61-66;
Transcript of Trial at 1089-91, Prosecutor v. Taylor (Jan. 11, 2008) (SCSL-03-01-T). See generally FACT-
FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, sapra note 7, at 108-09.
17. See, e.g., Akayesu Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 185, 237; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-
04-16-A, Judgment, para. 907 (Feb. 22, 2008); Military I Transcript, July 2, 2003, supra note 15, at
32-35; Transcript of Trial at 108-11, Prosecutor v. Ntakirurimana (Sept. 26, 2001) (ICTR 96-17-T);
Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 158, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 14, 2001)
(Case No. 09/2000) [hereinafter Los Palos Case Notes, Aug. 14, 2001]; AFRC Transcript, July 11, 2005,
supra note 15, at 145-46; Transcript of Trial at 35-47, Prosecutor v. Norman (June 3, 2005) (SCSL-04-
14-T); Transcript of Trial at 91-93, 109-17, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Apr. 7, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Deci-
sion on Sesay Defense Motion to Direct the Prosecutor to Investigate the Matter of False Testimony by
Witness TFl-366, paras. 45-48, Prosecutor v. Sesay (July 26, 2006) (SCSL-04-15-T); Taylor Transcript,
Jan. 8, 2008, supra note 15, at 75 5-58; Transcript of Trial at 3348-5 1, Prosecutor v. Taylor (Feb. 7,
2008) (SCSL-03-01-T); Taylor Transcript, Mar. 13, 2008, supra note 15, at 5974-76. See generally FACT-
FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, aura note 7, at 110-11.
18. See, e.g., Bagilishema Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 403, 415; Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note
15, para. 192; Prosecutor v. Guterres, Case No. 18a/2003, Judgment, at 3 (Feb. 28, 2005) (hereinafter
Guterres Judgment]; Transcript of Continued Trial at 24, Prosecutor v. Karera (Feb. 1, 2006) (ICTR-01-
74-T) [hereinafter Karera Transcript, Feb. 1, 2006]; Transcript of Continued Trial at 63, Prosecutor v.
Muhimana (Apr. 15, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T) [hereinafter Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 15, 2004];
Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 19, 2004, supra note 15, at 55; Transcript of Continued Trial at 68-69,
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defendant's key involvement in the crime, even though the witness's pre-
trial statement, or series of statements, fails even to mention the
defendant.19
For my past research, I did make some limited efforts to quantify incon-
sistencies to get a rough idea of the scope of the problem,2 0 but for this
research, I dramatically expanded those quantification efforts by creating a
large and rich dataset and by considering a host of explanatory factors. Part
II conveys my findings in considerable depth, so it suffices to note here some
of the myriad issues that I explore. My research reveals the percentage of
Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Apr. 30, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T) [hereinafter Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 30,
2004); Transcript of Trial at 109-19, Prosecutor v. Brima (Mar. 8, 2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); Brima Tran-
script, July 21, 2005, supra note 15, at 43-5 1; Transcript of Trial at 6-7, Prosecutor v. Brima (Mar. 9,
2005) (SCSL-04-16-T); CDF Transcript, June 21, 2004, supra note 15, at 48-50; Transcript of Trial at
78-79, Prosecutor v. Norman (Feb. 11, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T); Transcript of Trial at 90-91, Prosecutor
v. Norman (Feb. 24, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T); Transcript of Trial at 18-27, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Mar. 23,
2006) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at 18-27, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Jan. 25, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-
T); Transcript of Trial at 32-35, 80, 99-101, 104-06, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Apr. 8, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-
T); Transcript of Trial at 17-18, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Nov. 7, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Case Notes of
Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 103, Prosecutor v. Marques (July 31, 2001) (Case No. 9/
2000); Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 129, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 7,
2001) (Case No. 9/2000); Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 141, Prosecutor v.
Marques (Aug. 8, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000); Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at
164, 167, Prosecutor v. Marques (Aug. 16, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000); Los Palos Case Notes, Aug. 14,
2001, supra note 17, at 158; Los Palos Case Notes, Aug. 21, 2001, supra note 15, at 177; Case Notes of
Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 223, Prosecutor v. Marques (Sept. 20, 2001) (Case No. 9/
2000); Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 265-66, Prosecutor v. Marques (Sept.
24, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000); Case Notes of Judicial System Monitoring Programme at 272, Prosecutor
v. Marques (Sept. 25, 2001) (Case No. 9/2000). See generally FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note
7, at 111-12.
19. See, e.g., Akayesu Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 248, 266; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No.
ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 269 (Dec. 18, 2008); Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note
15, para. 54; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 467
(Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Judgment); Karera Judgment, supra note 15, para. 53; Musema
Judgment, supra note 15, para. 440; Niyitegeka Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 101, 154, 158; Prosecu-
ror v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 244 (Feb. 21, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Judgment, paras. 114, 145, 192 (Sept. 20, 2006);
Simba Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 107-08, 195; Prosecutor v. Da Costa, Case No. 22/2003, Judg-
ment, at 5 (Apr. 25, 2005); Paulino de Jesus Judgment, supra note 15, at 9; Prosecutor v. Tacaqui, Case
No. 20/2001, Judgment, at 26-27 (Dec. 9, 2004); Brima Transcript, July 11, 2005, supra note 15, at
140-50; Transcript of Continued Trial at 22, Prosecutor v. Gacumbirsi (Aug. 19, 2003) (ICTR-01-64-T)
(hereinafter Gacumbitsi Transcript, Aug. 19, 2003]; Transcript of Trial at 85-96, Prosecutor v. Kaje-
lijeli (Dec. 5, 2001) (ICTR-98-44A-T) (hereinafter Kajelijeli Transcript, Dec. 5, 2001]; Transcript of
Trial at 27-28, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (Dec. 7, 2001) (ICTR-98-44A-T) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Tran-
script, Dec. 7, 2001]; Kamuhanda Transcript, Sept. 19, 2001, supra note 15, at 72-73; Transcript of
Continued Trial at 55-56, Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Mar. 30, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T); Transcript of
Continued Trial at 22-24, Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Apr. 29, 2004) (ICTR-95-IB-T) [hereinafter
Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 29, 2004]; Ntakirutimana Transcript, Sept. 20, 2001, supra note 16, at
32-33; Transcript of Trial at 24-25, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka (Aug. 13, 2002) (ICTR-96-14-T) [herein-
after Niyitegeka Transcript, Aug. 13, 2002); Transcript of Trial at 95-111, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Jan. 24,
2004) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at 18-20, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Oct. 19, 2004) (SCSL-04-15-
T); Transcript of Trial at 30, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Nov. 25, 2004) (SCSL-04-15-T); Transcript of Trial at
36-40, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Feb. 3, 2005) (SCSL-04-15-T); Sesay Transcript, Mar. 23, 2006, supra note
18, at 77-80, 141-45; Los Palos Case Notes, Sept. 18, 2001, at 255-56.
20. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 118-21.
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prosecution witnesses who testified inconsistently with their previous state-
ments/testimonies, and more importantly, the percentage whose inconsis-
tencies are sufficiently worrisome that we would call them "serious," a term
I will subsequently define.21 In addition, I considered a variety of explana-
tory variables such as the witness's gender, ethnicity, accomplice status, and
imprisonment status. Thus, for instance, Part II presents tabular data show-
ing whether male witnesses were more likely to testify seriously inconsis-
tently than female witnesses; whether Hutu witnesses were more likely to
testify seriously inconsistently than Tutsi witnesses; and whether witnesses
who were imprisoned for genocide crimes were more likely to testify seri-
ously inconsistently than witnesses who were not. In addition to witness
characteristics, I considered various factors regarding the type, number, and
timing of the witness's previous representations. Consequently, Part II de-
tails correlations between seriously inconsistent testimony and (1) the num-
ber of previous statements/testimonies a witness provided; (2) the judicial
system in which those statements/testimonies were provided; and (3) the
time that elapsed between the statements/testimonies and the later inconsis-
tent testimony. Finally, Part II considers time trends and presents the re-
sults of several regressions 22 that took into account a comprehensive set of
explanatory variables. These regressions reveal which factors are statistically
significant predictors of serious inconsistencies.
Testimonial deficiencies such as serious inconsistencies provide important
information about the evidentiary foundations of international criminal
judgments, but they tell only part of the story of fact-finding. The more
important part examines the Trial Chambers' responses to testimonial defi-
ciencies. Whatever the quality of the evidence a Trial Chamber receives, it
will not affect the soundness of its judgments so long as the Trial Chamber
accurately assesses the quality of the evidence and finds facts in accordance
with that assessment. In other words, deficient testimony need not lead to
deficient fact-finding. For purposes of my 2010 book, I took a summary
look at the Trial Chambers' treatment of testimonial deficiencies, and I re-
ported some troubling findings. For one thing, although some Trial Cham-
bers mentioned some testimonial deficiencies, many did so only passingly,
and some did not mention them at all. 23 In addition, when Trial Chambers
did mention testimonial deficiencies, they seemed almost reflexively in-
clined to attribute them to innocent causes that had no negative bearing on
the witness's credibility. For instance, some Trial Chambers invoked the
witness's educational or experiential deficiencies to explain their failure to
provide relevant information or to answer whole ranges of probative ques-
21. See infra text at note 64.
22. A regression refers to the average relationship between a dependent variable that a researcher is
trying to explain and one or more explanatory variables.
23. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 180-83.
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tions. 24 As for serious inconsistencies in particular, I concluded that Trial
Chambers often "explain these away as products of the passage of time, the
frailty of memory, and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters.
The Trial Chambers thus give the prosecution witnesses the benefit of the
doubt, and they explain away problematic features of their testimony on the
basis of innocent factors that are beyond the witnesses' control." 25 In sum,
although my prior research was not comprehensive or quantitative, it sug-
gested that many Trial Chambers adopted a cavalier attitude toward testi-
monial deficiencies in general and serious inconsistencies in particular.
This Article quantifies the qualitative impressions just described. Specifi-
cally, in this Article, I have assessed each and every factual allegation
brought by the prosecution in each of the nineteen cases studied. I have
determined which witnesses' testimonies supported which allegations, and I
have coded the Trial Chambers' conclusions regarding each witness's testi-
mony. My findings are presented in Part III, and they paint a fascinating
picture of the Trial Chambers' assessments of witness testimony and the
factors that influence those assessments. Again, I have considered a variety of
explanatory variables to assess whether gender, ethnicity, imprisonment sta-
tus, accomplice status, or the presence of a serious inconsistency played a
role in the Trial Chambers' treatment of witness testimony. In addition and
most notably, I have considered the Trial Chambers' testimonial assessments
over time and learned that the somewhat unflattering picture I presented six
years ago has changed for the better. Part III provides the relevant details,
but suffice it to say here that during the course of the ICTR's life, its Trial
Chambers became increasingly skeptical of prosecution witness testimony
and subjected that testimony to increasingly rigorous scrutiny.
Part IV seeks to explain the study's findings, many of which are surpris-
ing. The incidence of serious inconsistencies did not change as I expected,
and it was not correlated with as many explanatory variables as I expected.
The data do, however, reveal important clues about the most significant
question surrounding serious inconsistencies: their cause. Obviously, multi-
ple causes underlie a phenomenon as multi-faceted as serious inconsistencies;
however, the data do suggest that some causes play a more prominent role
than others. In particular, the data indicate that defense counsel may have
had it right all along when they claimed that serious inconsistencies usually
reflect false testimony. Turning to the big picture, the research, taken in its
entirety, depicts a tribunal that confronted a relatively constant stream of
evidentiary deficiencies but that altered-for the better-its responses to
those deficiencies. The reasons for that evolution cannot be ascertained with
certainty, but Part IV identifies both external circumstances that likely
played a role as well as an internal maturation process that encompasses the
24. Id. at 190.
25. Nancy Amoury Combs, Testimonial Deficiencies and Evidentiary Uncertainties in International Criminal
Trials, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 235, 264 (2009).
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ICTR but that extends far beyond it. Indeed, the research presented here has
particularly broad implications for the international criminal justice project
as a whole, many of which are explored in this Article's conclusion.
II: EXPLANATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Section A explains why I chose the particular topics that form the basis of
this study and how this research will enhance understanding of international
criminal fact-finding. Section B details my methodology.
A. Explaining the Research Focus: A Spotlight on Serious Inconsistencies and
judicial Assessments of Witness Testimony
In past work, I identified a host of testimonial deficiencies that challenge
international criminal fact-finding. Having decided in this piece to explore
fact-finding through a rigorous empirical study, I necessarily had to narrow
my focus. However, such a narrowing has the potential to distort, first be-
cause fact-finding is a holistic endeavor that cannot be reduced to a few
isolated phenomena, and second because the phenomena that form the basis
for the study, if not chosen correctly, can take on unjustified importance
while at the same time inappropriately minimizing other, perhaps equally
important factors. Because that potential for distortion exists, I will explain
my research focus in some detail.
First, I chose to study serious inconsistencies because I consider them to
be the most prevalent and pernicious testimonial deficiency challenging in-
ternational criminal fact-finding. 2 6 Why are serious inconsistencies so perni-
cious? Most obviously, it is because they call into question the accuracy of
the testimony in which they appear. 2 7 It goes without saying that witness
testimony that sharply diverges from a witness's previous representations is
testimony that is less reliable and probably less likely to be accurate than
testimony that does not so diverge. Inconsistencies, therefore, introduce con-
siderable uncertainty into fact-finding.
To be sure, serious inconsistencies are not the only evidentiary phenom-
ena that create uncertainty. For instance, my prior research revealed that
international witnesses often do not know the answers to key questions that
fact-finders need to ask in order to determine with any sort of certainty the
who, what, where, and when details of the crimes in question. 2 8 It also high-
lighted numerous instances in which witnesses appeared to know answers to
relevant questions but were unable or unwilling to convey those answers in a
26. Serious inconsistencies also challenge domestic court prosecutions of international crimes. See
Ruth A. Kok, National Adjudication of International Crimes, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 211, 214-15 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014).
27. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 166; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Prior Inconsistent
Statements and Collateral Matters, 19 CRIM. JUST. 45, 45 (2004).
28. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 21-44.
55
56 Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 58
way that was comprehensible to their Western interlocutors.29 Serious in-
consistencies, in my view, have a greater potential to impair accurate fact-
finding than some of these other deficiencies, for reasons I explain below.
Yet upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the primary impediment
challenging accurate fact-finding at the international tribunals is not the
existence of one or another individual testimonial deficiencies, but instead
the very prevalence of witness testimony in international criminal trials. In
short, witness testimony usually forms the exclusive basis for international
criminal convictions, 0 and that in itself is a problem.
It is a problem because eyewitness testimony is frequently unreliable,"
and indeed such testimony has been blamed for a large proportion of the
wrongful convictions that have come to light in recent years. 32 However
problematic it is for the international tribunals to rely almost exclusively on
witness testimony, the problem has had little remedy, at least historically,
because little non-testimonial evidence of international crimes has typically
29. Id. at 44-62.
30. Id. at 11-14; see also THIERRY CRUVELLIER, COURT OF REMORSE: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 20 (Chari Voss trans., 2010). There are some exceptions to this rule.
For instance, the Khmer Rouge, like the Nazis, documented many of their atrocities, so the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) did receive large quantities of documentary evidence
in Case 001. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav "Duch," Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment,
para. 56 (July 26, 2010); HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF LAW, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT: USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 5 (2012) ("(T]he Court has relied heavily on documentary evidence, including
lists of prisoners who were executed, photographs, and annotations written on 'confessions' of prisoners
by their torturers."). Moreover, the ICTY did make more use of some non-testimonial evidence than
other current international tribunals have. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prli6, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment,
para. 268 (May 29, 2013) (noting that the Chamber admitted a total of 9,756 items of documentary
evidence); Prosecutor v. Popovi6, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, para. 260 n.835 (June 10, 2010);
Prosecutor v. KuprelkiV, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 184, 278, 395, 489(b) & nn.226, 309,
510, 507 (Jan. 14, 2000). In addition, prosecutors in the ICC case against Laurent Gbagbo have prom-
ised not only to introduce the testimony of 138 witnesses but also certain government documents. See
Tom Maliti, Prosecutor: We Have Evidence to Prove Case against Gbagbo and Bl/Goudd, INT'L JUST. MONITOR
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/201 6 /01/prosecutor-we-have-evidence-to-prove-case-against-
gbagbo-and-ble-goude/. By and large, however, facts are proven at the international tribunals through
witness testimony and fact witness testimony: in each of the SCSL's first two trials, the prosecution
presented only three expert witnesses out of seventy-five and fifty-nine prosecution witnesses, respec-
tively. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, Annex F, para. 21 (Aug. 2,
2007) [hereinafter CDF Judgment); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment,
paras. 10, 149 (June 20, 2007). Some early ICTR cases similarly featured a few expert witnesses, but
many of the more recent cases have featured only one or none at all. As for the ICC, the prosecution called
only three expert witnesses out of thirty-six in Labanga, see Lubanga Judgment, supra note 5, para. 11,
and it called no expert witnesses in Katanga, see Katanga Judgment, supra note 12, para. 21.
31. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, sapra note 7, at 14-15. More recent research has only confirmed
the problems associated with eye-witness testimony. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 46-83 (2011); Deborah Davis & Elizabeth
F. Loftus, The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from the Past and Projecting into the Age of
Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769, 769-74 (2012).
32. See GARRETT, supra note 31, at 8-9, 48 (finding that eyewitnesses misidentified 76 percent of the
250 exonerees in the author's study); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
78-79 (2008); Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes/eyewitness-misidentification/ (reporting that 72 percent of wrongful convictions are caused by
eyewitness misidentifications).
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been available to most international tribunals.33 Unlike Nazi war criminals
who left carefully crafted, meticulous documentation of their atrocities,
most modern day mass killers leave few written records, 34 and because trials
of international crimes often take place many years, if not decades, after the
crimes occurred, most international tribunals likewise receive little forensic
evidence." Furthermore, most modern atrocities occur in places that do not
feature the widespread use of documentation or technology that can be so
useful in proving a person's whereabouts or other basic facts. Indeed, alibis
are wildly popular defenses at many international tribunals3 6 probably be-
cause they can be plausibly claimed through a few corroborating witnesses.
That is, whereas a defendant in a Western criminal trial who put forth an
alibi defense would be expected to present receipts, ATM statements, or
similar documentation to prove his presence at the claimed location, no such
expectations exist with respect to a Rwandan defendant claiming an alibi
because the Rwandan defendant truly might have spent considerable time in
a location without generating documentary evidence to prove that he was
there. 7 Even ascertaining who is who can prove problematic at an interna-
33. In a forthcoming empirical study, I document the way in which criminal evidence is changing,
particularly in developing societies and particularly with respect to non-cestimonial evidence. In short,
prosecutors of mass atrocities in developing nations have begun gaining access to greater quantities of
non-testimonial evidence, and as the forthcoming piece explains, access to this evidence is poised to
transform international criminal fact-finding.
34. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 65 (May 21, 1999) [here-
inafter Kayishema Judgment). As I explain in a forthcoming piece, Deconstructing the Epistemic Challenges
to Mass Atrocity Prosecutions, the prevalence of non-testimonial evidence of international crimes is corre-
lated with the development status of the location where the crimes took place. As a general matter, trials
of international crimes occurring in developed nations feature more non-testimonial evidence than trials
of international crimes occurring in developing nations. Because most recent international tribunal prose-
cutions of international crimes have centered on crimes occurring in developing nations, the bodies
prosecuting these crimes have had little access to non-testimonial evidence.
35. ICTY Trial Chambers did receive non-trivial quantities of forensic evidence. It was unusual in
that regard among international tribunals. Virtually the only forensic evidence submitted to ICTR Trial
Chambers was introduced to prove that a genocide occurred: that is, it proved only that certain large-
scale massacres did take place and that the victims of those massacres were Tutsi. See, e.g., Kayishema
Judgment, supra note 34, paras. 325-26, 432. But see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T,
Judgment and Sentence, paras. 245, 252, 259, 260 (Feb. 25, 2004) (noting testimony by eyewitnesses
and medical examiners that several exhumed bodies were identifiable as the remains of specific individu-
als). Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman maintain that, "investigators made no systematic effort to
gather documentary and forensic evidence linking alleged suspects to specific crimes." Alison Des Forges
& Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 53 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds.,
2004). The SCSL likewise received virtually no forensic evidence. But see Transcript of Open Session at
39-47, Prosecutor v. Norman (June 20, 2005) (SCSL-04-14-T) (testimony of forensic anthropologist
William Haglund who, after examining the remains of four victims, determined that they had died from
injuries that were consistent with their relatives' descriptions of events).
36. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 162-65 (reporting that, as of 2010, more
than 81 percent of ICTR defendants proffered alibis and that two of three SCSL cases then decided
featured alibis).
37. In many countries like Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, commer-
cial exchanges are carried out by means of cash or goods. Many transactions, particularly in rural areas,
take the form of barter. See, e.g., Paul Cleary, It's the Economy Stupid, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2007), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB117987369444611381; Supporting Economic Growth in East Timor, THE ASIA
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tional criminal trial because international witnesses frequently do not have
birth certificates or other probative forms of official identification.38
This lack of non-testimonial evidence renders accurate fact-finding more
difficult, and it also increases the distortive potential of all the testimonial
deficiencies I have discussed, including and perhaps especially serious incon-
sistencies. To be sure, fact-finding is a holistic process during which fact-
finders take account of a host of relevant factors. The extent to which a
witness's testimony diverges from her previous representations is certainly
one of those factors, but it is not the only one, and it may not even be a
particularly important one in a trial that features a substantial quantity of
non-testimonial evidence. For instance, although any criminal defense attor-
ney would cross-examine a prosecution witness about inconsistencies be-
tween the witness's testimony and her previous representations,39 the
availability of non-testimonial evidence, such as documents, surveillance
videos, wiretaps, and electronic data, provide defense counsel with other ave-
nues to undermine the witness's testimony. For example, it may not matter
much that a witness's testimony sharply diverges from her pre-trial state-
ment if her testimony is strongly corroborated by a surveillance video, or-
even more to the point-if the witness's testimony is flatly contradicted by
the video. In those instances, serious inconsistencies may remain a compo-
nent of the credibility/reliability assessment that the fact-finder must con-
duct, but the other, more probative evidence will render that component an
insignificant one.
FOUNDATION, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/EastTimorEconGrowth.pdf; Stephanie Fahey, The
Future of East Timor: Threats and Opportunities for Economic Development of a Small Island State, RES. INST.
FOR ASIA AND THE PAC. (RIAP), U. of Sydney, http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran-storage/www.usyd.edu
.au/ContentPages/25917341.pdf. Cash exchanges are more prevalent in urban areas. See, e.g., Country
Information: Sierra Leone, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/country/sierra-
leone.html ("Sierra Leone is a cash economy."); Maurice K. Toroitich, Banking in Rwanda,
Worldfolio.com, http://www.theworldfolio.com/interviews/banking-in-rwanda/4147/ ("One of the big-
gest challenges that we have in Rwanda is that we are still a very cash-based economy."); Foreign Travel
Advice: Central African Republic, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/central-african-repub-
lic/ (last updated Aug. 4, 2016); Foreign Travel Advice: Democratic Republic of Congo, GOV.UK, https://
www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/democratic-republic-of-congo/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2016); Faridah
Kulabako, Ugandan Credit Card Uptake Remains Low, DAILY MONITOR (Apr. 16, 2012), http://
www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/-/688616/1387624/-/view/printVersion/-18vsnl9/-lindex.html; see
also Jake Kendall & Jan Sonnenschein, Many Transactions in Sub-Saharan Africa Still in Cash, GALLUP
(June 11, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155126/transactions-sub-saharan-africa-cash.aspx.
38. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, and Sierra
Leone-all locations forming the subject of international criminal trials-only 31 percent, 49 percent
and 51 percent of births are registered, respectively. The registration rate for Rwandan births is 82
percent. See UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2016: A FAIR CHANCE FOR EVERY
CHILD 150-52 tbl.9 (2016).
39. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Examination of a Witness Based on a Prior Statement, 49 Am.JUR. TRIALS 501,
§ 2 (2015) ("There is perhaps nothing more potentially devastating on cross-examination than impeach-
ing a witness with that witness's own prior statement.").
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By contrast, in international tribunal proceedings-where witness testi-
mony is often the only evidence presented 4 0-inconsistencies inevitably play
a much more prominent role. Defense counsel seeking to undermine prose-
cution witness testimony but having no non-testimonial evidence by which
to do so, frequently place inconsistencies at the center of their cross-exami-
nation. 4 1 To be sure, defense counsel also advance their clients' cases in other
important ways. They present their own witnesses, who often contradict
prosecution witness testimony, and they seek to undermine prosecution wit-
ness testimony in ways unrelated to inconsistencies. For instance, defense
counsel expose prosecution witness testimony that seems improbable, 42 they
highlight incentives that might motivate witnesses to falsely inculpate the
defendant, 43 and they point out inconsistencies between witnesses.4 4 Despite
the fact that international defense counsel unquestionably employ a multi-
pronged approach when challenging prosecution witness testimony, they
also unquestionably focus considerable attention-perhaps the lion's
share-on prosecution witness testimony that is inconsistent with previous
40. Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, justice Delayed Can Be justice Delivered, 50
HARV. INT'L L, J. 323, 339 (2009).
41. Even in the prosecution of domestic crimes, it has been recognized that "[ilmpeachment by means
of a prior inconsistent statement . . . is one of the most effective means of impeachment." Michael H.
Graham, Impeachment of Witness-Prior Inconsistent Statements, 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTs 2D 101, § 1
(2015); see also ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, How TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL
(1985).
42. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, Judgment and Sentence, para.
191 (July 15, 2004) (noting that the "Defence challenges the plausibility and consistency of Witness
CGH's testimony that he was present in the room during the Accused's visit to Bourgmestre Karara's
house," questioning why the witness would risk being seen by the Accused, who knew him to be a Tutsi,
when he had a "room that was reserved for him as a hiding place"); id. at paras. 195, 241; Prosecutor v.
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sesay Defense Final Trial Brief, paras. 276, 1068 (Aug. 7, 2008) [herein-
after Sesay Defense Final Trial Brief).
43. For ICTR cases, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment and
Sentence, para. 494, n.716 (Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Bizimungu Judgment] (noting that defense
counsel made allegations and presented witnesses to show that Witness GJQ had a pattern of lying in
order to further his own self-interest and providing examples); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No.
ICTR-96-17, Judgment and Sentence, para. 167 & n.211 (Feb. 21, 2003) ("[T~he Defence suggested
that the witness was testifying against the Accused in the expectation that he would gain an early release
from the Rwandan authorities."). As for the SCSL, defense counsel in Prosecutor v. Brima [hereinafter
AFRC case] alleged that insider witness Gibril Massaquoi had been informed by SCSL investigators that
he was a suspect, and he agreed to testify in order to escape an indictment, see Kyra Sanin, U.C. Berkeley
War Crimes Studies Center, Special Court Monitoring Program, Update No. 58, Oct. 10, 2005, at 4,
and defense counsel in Prosecutor v. Sesay [hereinafter RUF case) made similar claims regarding insider
witness John Tarnue, Transcript of Trial at 10, Prosecutor v. Sesay (Oct. 7, 2004) (SCSL-04-15-T).
44. See, e.g., Transcript of Continued Trial at 36-37, Prosecutor v. Karemera (Mar. 1, 2006) (ICTR-
98-44-T) (Defense Counsel asked Trial Chamber to "appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the false
testimony of Ahmed Mbonyunkiza" after a second witness's testimony contradicted Mbonyunkiza's testi-
mony); Bizimungu Judgment, supra note 43 at para. 224 ("The Mugiraneza Defence submits that the
Prosecution witnesses allege two different rallies and that both accounts are unreliable."); id. at n.346;
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, paras. 277-278, 335, 3491, 4096 (May 18,
2012); Sesay Defense Final Trial Brief, supra note 42, paras. 833, 850, 873, 1075, 1116, 1256 (Aug. 7,
2008); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Morris Kallon Final Trial Brief, paras. 10, 222, 302,
322-23, 391-93 435, 531, 535, 713, 740, 763, 807, 812-13, 817 (Sept. 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Gbao-Final Trial Brief, paras. 373, 1429, 1484 (July 31, 2008).
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statements/testimonies. Although I did not gather data on the proportion of
cross-examination time that defense counsel devoted to probing inconsisten-
cies, I can say with certainty that, in most cases, such probing occupied a
substantial proportion of the cross-examination. Prosecutors likewise spend
considerable time probing inconsistencies in the testimony of defense
witnesses.
The parties focus so much attention on inconsistencies for three reasons.
The first has already been discussed: the lack of non-testimonial evidence in
international criminal trials leaves counsel with limited avenues for calling
into doubt the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of their testimony.
So, with few alternatives available, inconsistencies take center stage. 4  Sec-
ond, addressed more thoroughly in Part III, is the prevalence of inconsisten-
cies. That is, counsel focus on inconsistencies because there are a lot of
inconsistencies on which to focus-both at the ICTR and elsewhere. 4 6 As
Part III reveals, 67 percent of prosecution witnesses in the nineteen ICTR
cases I studied presented testimony that was in some way inconsistent with
their previous representations, and nearly 50 percent testified in a way that
was seriously inconsistent. Third and finally, ICTR counsel in particular
focus on inconsistencies because a great deal of ICTR testimony features
mistakes or lies, and scrutinizing inconsistencies may help to separate the
accurate from the inaccurate.4 7
It is apparent that a great deal of ICTR testimony features mistakes or lies
because ICTR trials are filled with witnesses who blatantly contradict one
another.4 , My previous research has shown that more than 90 percent of
ICTR cases featured at least one blatant contradiction between witnesses for
the defense and witnesses for the prosecution. 49 Many cases featured far more
than one, and most multiple-defendant cases featured at least one contradic-
tion relating to each defendant.50 I considered witness testimony to be bla-
tantly contradictory only where the testimony of one witness was
diametrically opposed to the testimony of another, such that both witnesses'
45. See, e.g., Bagilishema Judgment, supra note 15, para. 549 ("In the absence of details, the Chamber
has looked into the witness's previous written statements.").
46. At the SCSL, for instance, 54 percent of witnesses in the AFRC case testified seriously inconsis-
tently; so too did 53 percent of witnesses in the RUF case and 35 percent in Prosecutor v. Norman
[hereinafter CDF case]. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, SUPra note 7, at 118-19.
47. Some empirical research shows greater levels of inconsistencies among liars. One particularly nota-
ble study showed that liars were "significantly more likely than truth tellers to add details to later
statements that they had not mentioned in earlier statements." Anneliese Vredeveldr, et al., The Inconsis-
tent Suspect: A Systematic Review of Different Types of Consistency in Truth Tellers and Liars, in INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEWING 183, 189-93 (Ray Bull, ed., 2014). However, other studies show liars to be equally or
even more consistent than truth tellers. See id. at 193-94.
48. Some ICTR judgments likewise contradict one another. See Mark A. Drumbl, The Curious Crimi-
nality of Mass Atrocity: Diverse Actors, Multiple Truths, and Plural Responses, in PLURALISM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 68, 78, 98 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014).
49. Nancy Amoury Combs, A New Look at Fact-Finding at the ICTR: Advances in judicial Acknowledge-
ment, 26 CRIM. L.F. 387, 393-94 (2015).
50. Id. at 394.
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allegations could not possibly be true. When witnesses contradict one an-
other in this way, it becomes apparent that one or the other witness was
necessarily testifying inaccurately, either on purpose or by mistake. As
noted, ICTR cases virtually never featured any non-testimonial evidence to
assist in determining which witness's testimony was inaccurate, so the par-
ties naturally looked to inconsistencies. That is, when a prosecution witness
testifies that the defendant led a massacre, and defense witnesses claim that
the defendant was with them hundreds of miles from the massacre site, and
no other evidence of the defendant's whereabouts during the massacre is
available, then key differences between the prosecution witness's testimony
and her previous representations understandably take on crucial significance.
In sum, inconsistencies play a central role in this study because they play
a central role in international criminal trials. Inconsistencies stand as the
most high-profile testimonial deficiency confronting international tribunals
and the deficiency that provides particularly useful information when wit-
nesses testify contradictorily. To understand international criminal trials,
then, a deeper understanding of the inconsistencies that feature so promi-
nently in these trials must be gained.
My focus on the Trial Chambers' assessments of witness testimony needs
less explanation. The accuracy of a court's factual findings is of central con-
cern to all court watchers and participants. Although it is impossible to
determine whether a court's findings are accurate when the facts are con-
tested, it is possible to evaluate the court's fact-finding methodology. What
are the characteristics of the witnesses whom the Trial Chambers credit?
How often and for what reasons do the Trial Chambers decline to rely on
prosecution witness testimony? The answers to these and similar questions
provide important insights into the court's fact-finding methodology, and
that methodology helps us to assess the likely accuracy of the court's factual
findings. Scholars of any criminal justice system desire the answers to those
questions, but often they cannot get them. American scholars, for instance,
can learn little about the credibility and reliability assessments made during
a criminal trial because American criminal trials end with a jury verdict of
guilty or not guilty, and no further information about the jury's assessment
of the evidence is available. International tribunals, by contrast, issue ex-
traordinarily long judgments that typically detail all of the evidence
presented and the Trial Chamber's assessment of that evidence. Although
many criticize the long length of tribunal judgments," one benefit of such
careful detailing of the evidence is that it provides scholars with a trove of
data that can help us to better understand the way in which international
tribunals carried out what may be their most important function: fact-
finding.
51. See, e.g., GIDEON BOAS ET AL., 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER LIBRARY: IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 376 (2013); Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and
Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 950, 956 (2005).
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Finally, this section concludes by explaining why the Article centers on
ICTR cases, rather than the cases of another international criminal tribunal.
In order to have confidence in these findings, a reasonably large number of
cases is needed. That need immediately eliminates the ICC, the SCSL, and
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon from consideration because they have de-
cided, at most, only a few cases each. This leaves only the ICTR, the ICTY,
and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (Special Panels).
Although I have previously researched fact-finding at the Special Panels, and
found that research to reveal many important insights; for this empirical
study, Special Panels cases would not have been appropriate. Special Panels
transcripts are not readily available, and Special Panels judgments, if they
exist at all, are exceedingly short and undetailed. ICTY cases also would not
have provided an optimal dataset. For one thing, ICTY witnesses are some-
thing of an outlier in international criminal trials because, on average, they
are markedly better educated than witnesses appearing before other interna-
tional tribunals, and they are more likely to have had life experiences that
enable them to answer the kinds of questions typically posed in a criminal
trial. For that reason, ICTY trials featured fewer testimonial deficiencies.
Moreover, ICTY Trial Chambers received more non-testimonial evidence
than most other international tribunals, 5 2 and this evidence served both to
reduce the importance of witness testimony at the ICTY and concomitantly
the deficiencies common to such testimony. Thus, I could have studied seri-
ous inconsistencies in ICTY witness testimony because there were in fact at
least some ICTY witness testimony that featured such inconsistencies."
However, the far lower incidence of inconsistencies at the ICTY and their
reduced influence would likely have produced a distorted picture that would
not have generalized to fact-finding in other, current tribunals, which unfor-
tunately feature more problematic witness testimony and less non-testimo-
nial evidence. The ICTR, by contrast, decided a sufficient number of cases
that featured the kind of evidence that also appears in current tribunals,
such as the ICC. The size of the dataset that I was able to create gives me
confidence in my findings, and the evidentiary profile of the ICTR cases
gives me confidence in their generalizability across many international
tribunals.
B. Methodology
1. The Cases
As noted in the Introduction, my dataset comprises nineteen single-de-
fendant cases from the ICTR. Table 1 below shows the cases in chronologi-
52. See supra note 30.
53. See Patricia M. Wald, The Elusive Pursuit of Trust between Prosecutors and judges, in THE FIRST
GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 193, 196 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 2015).
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cal order along with the starting date of each trial, the ending date, and the
date on which the Trial Chamber issued its judgment in that case.
TABLE 1: STARTING, ENDING, AND JUDGMENTS DATES FOR EACH TRIAL
IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
Date of the Trial
Starting Date of the Ending Date of the Chamber's
Trial Trial Trial Judgment
Rutaganda Mar. 18, 1997 June 17, 1999 Dec. 6, 1999
Semanza Oct. 16, 2000 June 19, 2002 May 15, 2003
Kajelijeli Mar. 13, 2001 July 16, 2003 Dec. 1, 2003
Niyitegeka June 17, 2002 Feb. 28, 2003 May 16, 2003
Gacumbitsi July 28, 2003 Mar. 1, 2004 June 17, 2004
Muhimana Mar. 29, 2004 Jan. 20, 2005 Apr. 28, 2005
Seromba Sept. 20, 2004 June 27, 2006 Dec. 13, 2006
Karera Jan. 9, 2006 Nov. 24, 2006 Dec. 7, 2007
Renzaho Jan. 8, 2007 Feb. 15, 2008 July 14, 2009
Setako Aug. 25, 2008 Nov. 6, 2009 Feb. 25, 2010
Hategekimana Mar. 16, 2009 Apr. 28, 2010 Dec. 6, 2010
Munyakazi Apr. 22, 2009 Jan. 28, 2010 July 5, 2010
Ntawukulilyayo May 6, 2009 June 14, 2010 Aug. 3, 2010
Kanyarukiga Aug. 31, 2009 May 24, 2010 Nov. 1, 2010
Ngirabatware Sept. 23, 2009 July 25, 2012 Dec. 20, 2012
Gatete Oct. 20, 2009 Nov. 8, 2010 Mar. 31, 2011
Nzabonimana Nov. 9, 2009 Oct. 21, 2011 May 31, 2012
Nclahimana Sept. 6, 2010 Sept. 22, 2011 Dec. 30, 2011
Nizeyimana Jan. 17, 2011 Dec. 7, 2011 June 19, 2012
To facilitate the exploration of any relevant time trends, the dataset in-
cludes cases from the beginning, middle, and end of the Tribunal's life. In
addition, in order to ensure a representative sample, the dataset includes
cases featuring defendants who had high-level, mid-level, and low-level po-
sitions and defendants who participated in the genocide in a variety of ways
and across a variety of regions in Rwanda.1 4 Seventy-four-year-old- busi-
54. The nineteen cases in my dataset featured crimes in all but two of Rwanda's then-twelve prefec-
tures (Gikongoru and Umutara). Crimes in about half of the prefectures (Butare, Gitarama, Kibungo,
Kibuye, Kigali-Rural, Kigali-Ville, and Ruhengeri) were the subject of two or more cases.
55. Specifically, Munyakazi was seventy-four years old at the time his judgment was pronounced in
2010. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 29 (July 5,
2010) (hereinafter Munyakazi Judgment].
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nessman and farmer, Yussuf Munyakazi, for instance, was sufficiently low-
level that ICTR prosecutors sought (unsuccessfully) to refer his case to
Rwanda before eventually trying him at the ICTR.56 However, the dataset
also features such high-ranking defendants as Elidzer Niyitegeka and Augus-
tin Ngirabatware, who were Ministers in the Interim Government of
Rwanda during the genocide." The remaining defendants held a host of
other positions, some in the government,5 8 some in the military, 9 and one
in the Catholic Church. 60
The cases were decided by a total of twenty-eight judges.6 ' More particu-
larly, all of the cases were tried before a panel of three judges, and sixteen of
the judges participated in more than one trial in the dataset. 62 Each of the
defendants in the dataset was convicted of at least one of the charges leveled
against him. Cases in which defendants were acquitted of all charges were
not included. This dataset involves only prosecution witness testimony, and
prosecution witness testimony in trials ending in acquittals likely feature
56. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-RI Ibis, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for
Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, paras. 13-14 (May 28, 2008). The ICTR also sought to refer
other cases, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-02-78-1, Prosecutor's Request for the
Referral of the Case of Gaspard Kanyarukiga to Rwanda Pursuant to Rule I Ibis of the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (Sept. 7, 2007); Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R1 Ibis,
Decision on Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana Rwanda (June
19, 2008); Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. 2000-61-Rllbis-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008).
57. Niyitegeka Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 5; Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-
54-T, Judgment and Sentence at para. 7 (Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Ngirabatware Judgment].
58. Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 6 (bourgmestre); Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No.
ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. I (Mar. 31, 2011) (hereinafter Gatete Judgment)
(bourgmestre); Kajelijeli Judgment, supra note 15 at para. 6 (bourgmestre); Karera Judgment, supra note 15
at para. I (prefect); Muhimana Judgment, supra note 15 at para. 4 (conseiller); Prosecutor v. Ndahimana,
Case No. ICTR-01-68-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 1 (Dec. 30, 2011) [hereinafter NdahimanaJudg-
ment} (bourgmestre); Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, Case No. ICTR-05-82-T, Judgment and Sentence,
para. 1 (Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Neawakulilyayo Judgment) (sub-prefect); Prosecutor v.
Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 5 (May. 31, 2012) [hereinafter
Nzabonimana Judgment) (Rwandan Minister of Youth and Associative Movements).
59. Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 6 (Dec. 6,
2010) [hereinafter Hategekimana Judgment) (Lieutenant in the Forces Armies Rwandaises); Prosecutor v.
Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 1 (June 19, 2012) (hereinafter
Nizeyimana Judgment} (captain of military training school); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-
31-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 1 (July 14, 2009) [hereinafter Renzaho Judgment) (Colonel in
Rwandan army and prefect); Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-T, Judgment and Sentence,
para. 1 (Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Setako Judgment) (Lieutenant Colonel).
60. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-01-66-I, Judgment, para. 6 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter
Seromba Judgment].
61. The judges were Judges Aydin Sefa Akay, Florence Rita Arrey, Lennart Aspergen, Salomy Balungi
Bossa, Pavel Dolenc, Sergei Aleckseievich Egorov, Robert Fremr, Taghrid Hikmet, Karin Hdkborg,
Gberdao Gustave Kam, Lafty Kama, Khalida Rachid Khan, Winston Churchill Matanzima Maqutu,
Joseph Edward Chiondo Masanche, Erik Mose, Lee Gacugia Muthoga, Yakov Arkadievich Ostrovsky,
Seon Ki Park, Navanethem Pillay, Mparany Mamy Richard Rajohnson, Arlette Ramaroson, Jai Ram
Reddy, William Hussein Sekule, Emile Francis Short, Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Andrbsia Vaz, and
Loyd G. Williams.
62. The judges who participated in more than one trial were Judges Akay, Arrey, Bossa, Egorov,
Hikmet, Khan, Masanche, M0se, Muthoga, Park, Pillay, Rajohnson, Ramaroson, Sekule,
Tuzmukhamedov, and Vaz.
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greater deficiencies than prosecution witness testimony in ICTR trials as a
whole. Inclusion of these cases, therefore, could have biased the sample.
2. The Witnesses
The nineteen cases in the dataset featured 342 prosecution fact witnesses.
The gender, ethnicity, and other relevant characteristics of the 342 witnesses
are shown in Tables 2 through 5.
TABLE 2: GENDER COMPOSITION OF WITNESSES IN THE DATASET
Gender Number %
Male 255 74.56%
Female 86 25.15%
Unable to Ascertain 1 .29%
ToTAL 342 100%
TABLE 3: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF WITNESSES IN THE DATASET
Ethnicity Number %
Hutu 133 38.89%
Tutsi 192 56.14%
Neither 11 3.22%
Unable to Ascertain 6 1.75%
Total 342 100%
TABLE 4: ACCOMPLICE STATUS OF WITNESSES IN THE DATASET
Accomplice Status Number %
Accomplices of the Defendant 67 19.59%
Not Accomplices of the Defendant 266 77.78%
Unable to Ascertain 9 2.63%
TorAL 342 100%
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TABLE 5: IMPRISONMENT STATUS OF WITNESSES IN THE DATASET
Imprisonment Status Number %
Never Imprisoned for Genocide 264 77.19%
Imprisoned for Genocide but 20 5.85%
Released before Trial
Imprisoned for Genocide and Still 52 15.20%
Detained during Trial
Unable to Ascertain 6 1.75%
TOTAL 342 100%
The 342 witnesses in the dataset comprise all of the prosecution fact wit-
nesses who testified in the trials listed in Table 1. The average number of
prosecution fact witnesses per case was eighteen. Kanyarukiga had the lowest
number, at ten, and Nizeyimana the highest, at forty-one. The vast majority
of witnesses in the dataset, 97 percent, were Rwandan.
Why did I choose to study prosecution witnesses instead of defense wit-
nesses or instead of all of the witnesses in a given case? The decision to focus
on only one side's witnesses was driven by both practical and substantive
concerns. As a practical matter, I had the time to assess the testimony of
only a certain number of witnesses. If I had included in the database all of
the witnesses in each of the cases, then I would have had to reduce the
number of cases that I evaluated. I found that prospect undesirable because I
considered it important to include cases that featured a variety of different
kinds of defendants and cases that were tried during different periods in the
Tribunal's life. Thus, I believed that including more cases would produce
more certain results, even though that meant including a smaller number of
witnesses per case. Having made the decision to include witnesses from only
one side, I selected prosecution witnesses for two reasons. First, if we as-
sume, as most commentators do, that wrongful convictions are a greater
injustice than wrongful acquittals, 6 then we have more reason to be con-
cerned about problematic prosecution testimony than problematic defense
testimony. Moreover, although I have not systematically analyzed defense
witness testimony, my non-quantitative sense is that it features even more
serious inconsistencies than prosecution witness testimony. If that is correct,
then an exclusive focus on defense witness testimony would overstate the
problematic features of international tribunal testimony. As it stands, my
63. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1769); William 0.
Douglas, Foreword to JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 11 (1957). As Thomas Starkie
put it, the "maxim of the law is ... that it is better that ninety-nine . . . offenders shall escape than that
one innocent man be condemned." 9 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2497,
1650-51 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
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study potentially understates those problematic features, but I would prefer
to err in understating than in exaggerating.
3. The Inconsistencies
a. Defining Inconsistencies
I defined an inconsistency as witness testimony that was inconsistent with
the witness's pre-trial statements or previous testimony in other cases. Inter-
national tribunal testimony features numerous inconsistencies, but a non-
trivial proportion are minor or concern minor details in the trial. Thus, al-
though I gathered some data on all inconsistencies, I focused my research on
"serious" inconsistencies.
This study considers an "inconsistency or omission to be serious either if
it pertained to a key issue in the trial or if it pertained to the kind of fact
that one is unlikely to forget." 64 The former category included inconsisten-
cies or omissions "that directly related to the defendant's actions or overall
liability or to the witness's credibility or the weight the Trial Chamber
should place on the witness's testimony. "6, So, for instance, if a witness's
statement described the defendant as engaging in a different sort of criminal
behavior than that to which the witness testified, I considered that a serious
inconsistency.66 One example would be a witness who testified that the de-
fendant personally killed the victims when the statement reported that the
defendant was merely present during the killings. I likewise deemed an in-
consistency serious if it called into question the witness's ability to observe
the events she described. So, if the witness's pre-trial statement reported
that she was 100 meters from the crime site, but she testified that she was
five meters away, I considered that a serious inconsistency. 67 Finally, I con-
sidered it a serious inconsistency when a witness failed to mention in his
previous statements/testimonies a fact that was central to his testimony. The
most common example of this phenomenon occurred when a witness pro-
vided detailed statements that contained no reference to the defendant's par-
ticipation in the relevant crime, yet in later statements or sometimes only in
64. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, Supra note 7, at 121 (defining "serious inconsistency" in the
same way).
65. id.
66. See, e.g., Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 54, 192; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case
No. ICTR-02-78-T, Judgment, para. 605 (Nov. 1, 2010) (hereinafter Kanyarukiga Judgment];
Ndahimana Judgment, supra note 58, para. 464; Transcript of Continued Trial at 45, Prosecutor v.
Gacumbitsi (Aug. 5, 2003) (ICTR-01-64-T) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Transcript]; Muhimana Transcript,
Apr. 15, 2004, supra note 18, at 60; Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 19, 2004, supra note 15, at 55;
Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 30, 2004, supra note 18, at 68-69.
67. For examples of inconsistencies in this category, see, e.g., Kajelijeli Judgment, supra note 15, at
para. 680; Karera Judgment, supra note 15, at paras. 296, 299; Transcript of Continued Trial at 73,
Prosecutor v. Gacete (Nov. 10, 2009) (ICTR-2000-61-T) [hereinafter Gatete Transcript].
67
68 Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 58
testimony, the witness claimed that the defendant had played an integral
role in the crime.6 8
The second category of inconsistencies that I deemed to be serious in-
cluded those pertaining to the kind of facts that the witness was "unlikely
to forget" even if such facts were not of crucial significance to the resolution
of the case. So, for instance, I considered it serious "if a defendant testified
inconsistently about where he hid because one would expect that he'd re-
member whether he hid in the parish church, say, or in the bushes behind
his house. Similarly, I considered it a serious inconsistency if a witness testi-
fied that she hid with one of her children when her statement reported that
she hid with three of her children."69
b. Methodology for Identifying Inconsistencies
The best method for identifying inconsistencies would be to read each
witness's statements/testimonies and then compare the allegations contained
therein with the witness's ICTR testimony. Unfortunately, the ICTR, like
other international tribunals, places exhibits such as pre-trial statements and
testimony before Rwandan courts under seal, so they are not publicly availa-
ble. Consequently, those seeking to identify inconsistencies at the interna-
tional tribunals must rely on discussions of those inconsistencies that occur
during trial or descriptions of the inconsistencies that appear in the Trial
Chambers' judgments. This method of locating inconsistencies is apt to un-
derstate them for two reasons. First, as a general rule, inconsistencies in the
68. See, e.g., Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 54; Gatete Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 203 & n.222; Kajelijeli Judgment, supra note 15, at paras. 467, 522; Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra
note 66, at paras. 257, 311, 496, 605, 609, 611; Karera Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 53; Muhimana
Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 481; Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55, at para. 117; Ndahimana
Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 219-231, 233, 235-237, 250-254, 316, 441-450, 454-458,
466-468, 473, 645-646; Ngirabatware Judgment, supra note 57, at paras. 196, 844; Niyitegeka Judg-
ment, supra note 15, at paras. 101, 154, 158; Nizeyimana Judgment, supra note 59, at paras. 114, 369,
1089; Ntawukulilyayo Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 211-213, 218, 273, 370-373, 386-387;
Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 1038, 1071, 1421; Renzaho Judgment, supra note 59,
at paras. 433, 652; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judgment, para. 186 (Dec. 6,
1999) [hereinafter Rutaganda Judgment]; Seromba Judgment, supra note 60, at para. 237; Setako Judg-
ment, supra note 59, at paras. 110-116, 158-175, 178, 206, 271, 346-358, 372-378, 401, 425-429,
435, n.234; Gacumbirsi Transcript, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 19, at 22; Kajelijeli Transcript, Dec. 5,
2001, supra note 19, at 72-96; Kajelijeli Transcript, Dec. 7, 2001, supra note 19, at 27-28; Transcript of
Continued Trial at 13, 36-37, Prosecutor v. Karera (Jan. 9, 2006) (ICTR-01-74-T); Karera Transcript,
Feb. 1, 2006, supra note 18, at 24; Transcript of Continued Trial at 25-30, 34-36, Prosecutor v.
Muhimana (Apr. 7, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T); Muhimana Transcript, Apr. 29, 2004, supra note 19, at
22-24; Transcript of Continued Trial at 16-2 1, Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, (Mar. 18, 2010) (ICTR-99-
54-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 24-25, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka (Aug. 13, 2002) (ICTR-96-14-
T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 35-47, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Oct. 8, 1997) (ICTR-96-3-T);
Transcript of Continued Trial at 30-38, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Mar. 9, 1998) (ICTR-96-3-T); Tran-
script of Continued Trial at 33, Prosecutor v. Setako (Sept. 3, 1997) (ICTR-04-81-T); Transcript of
Continued Trial at 12, Prosecutor v. Setako (Feb. 24, 2009) (ICTR-04-81-T).
69. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 122. For a sampling of these sorts of inconsisten-
cies, see, e.g., Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 192; Gatete Judgment, supra note 58, at
paras. 96-97; Transcript of Continued Trial at 14-17, Prosecutor v. Gatete (Nov. 3, 2009) (ICTR-00-
61-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 53, Prosecutor v. Gatete (Nov. 5, 2009) (ICTR-00-61-T).
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testimony of prosecution witnesses are mentioned only by defense counsel,
and defense counsel almost certainly do not mention all of them. Second, not
all testimony is public, so inconsistencies that are discussed in closed testi-
mony and that are not later described in the Trial Chambers' judgment will
not become known. As I will discuss below, I cannot remedy the first source
of potential understatement, but I have sought to remedy the second.
Relying on defense counsel to highlight serious inconsistencies is sub-
optimal for two reasons. First, the skill, diligence, and strategic intuitions
that defense counsel bring to their representation vary considerably from
attorney to attorney. 70 So, although the transcripts show that most defense
counsel vigorously question prosecution witnesses on perceived inconsisten-
cies, in at least one case in my dataset, defense counsel seemed to eschew this
cross-examination technique entirely. 7 1 Second, ICTR trials are largely ad-
versarial, so even when defense counsel are generally inclined to point out
inconsistencies, they probably would mention only those whose identifica-
tion would advance their clients' interests. To be sure, pointing out any
inconsistency can serve to undermine a prosecution witness's credibility and
reliability, so it may be that defense counsel bring to light most of the
inconsistencies that they discover. However, it is reasonable to assume that
defense counsel become aware of some inconsistencies that they choose not
to point out. For instance, although we can be virtually certain that defense
counsel will (enthusiastically) point out an inconsistency in which the wit-
ness's testimony implicates the defendant in more criminal activity than
does the pre-trial statement, we cannot be so sure about the reverse. When a
witness's testimony is less inculpatory than his pre-trial statement, defense
counsel may see good reason to refrain from mentioning the more inculpa-
tory pre-trial statement. Thus, because I learned of inconsistencies only
when defense counsel referred to them, I have probably under-counted them
to some degree. At the same time, any under-counting may have been ame-
liorated by the fact that defense counsel have an incentive to exaggerate
inconsistencies; thus, they may describe allegations as inconsistent when
they are not in fact. Or, more plausibly, they might describe actual inconsis-
tencies in a way that overstates the importance or the degree of the diver-
gence. Cognizant of this possibility, I carefully considered the witnesses'
responses to defense counsel allegations and any subsequent re-direct testi-
mony that the prosecution elicited. Finally, the Trial Chambers mentioned a
70. As Cruvellier put it, "[the defense lawyers at the ICTR would always be as heterogeneous as they
were individual. . . . Up to the very end, there would always be a mix of those who were greedy, and
those who had integrity, the mediocre and the inspired, the nitpickers and the parsimonious, the pom-
pous and the first-rate cross-examiners, the brilliant litigants and the boring. Cruvellier, supra note
30, at 36.
71. In Munyakazi, defense counsel failed even to mention the statements of at least 70 percent of the
prosecution witnesses. See generally Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55.
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substantial proportion of serious inconsistencies, 7 2 so I cross-checked my as-
sessment of the inconsistencies with that of the Trial Chambers.
The second reason that I likely under-counted inconsistencies stems from
the fact that some transcripts are wholly unavailable and some testimony
appearing in available transcripts is held in camera, or "closed session", so it
does not appear in the publicly available transcripts.7 3 Testimony that is not
publicly available may feature serious inconsistencies, but we will not know
unless the Trial Chamber mentions them in its judgment. In order to take
account of serious inconsistencies that were "hidden" in this way, I used the
following formula (which extrapolates from the publicly available informa-
tion that we do have) to add an estimated percentage of serious
inconsistencies.
(P + .5Y&N)C, where
" P is the percentage of witnesses in the case in question whose serious
inconsistencies the Trial Chamber did not mention
* Y&N is the percentage of witnesses in that case for whom the Trial
Chamber mentioned some of their serious inconsistencies but not
others
" C is the percentage of cross-examination testimony held in camera in
that case
I applied the formula on a case-by-case basis, and I added the result reached
by the formula to the number of witnesses in that case who testified seri-
ously inconsistently.
As the formula shows, the primary factors in my calculation are the per-
centage of closed cross-examination testimony in a given case and the per-
centage of serious inconsistencies that the Trial Chamber in that case failed
to mention in its judgment. The formula includes only cross-examination
testimony held in camera because defense counsel virtually always raised in-
consistencies during cross-examination. Thus, in camera direct testimony was
unlikely to have featured serious inconsistencies. The formula assumes that
the larger the proportion of cross-examination held in camera, the more
likely that serious inconsistencies have gone unidentified. However, Trial
Chambers do mention some serious inconsistencies in their judgments, even
when the inconsistencies are discussed only in in camera testimony, so the
formula also takes account of the Trial Chambers' willingness to mention
serious inconsistencies. In particular, the formula assumes that the larger the
proportion of witnesses with serious inconsistencies whom the Trial Cham-
bers mentioned, the less likely that a serious inconsistency discussed in
closed testimony went unidentified. As it happens, Trial Chambers varied
considerably in their willingness to mention serious inconsistencies, which is
72. See infra text accompanying notes 127 and 128.
73. For the argument that excessive use of in camera testimony denies defendants the right to a public
trial, see Transcript of Trial Hearing at 27, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (Sept. 3, 2015) (ICC-01/04-02/06-T-
24-ENG).
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why I calculated the formula on a case-by-case basis. Finally, I added half
the percentage of witnesses labeled Y&N in that case, estimating that Trial
Chambers mentioned half of the serious inconsistencies of those labeled
Y&N. Because few witnesses were labeled Y&N, and because I believe the
rate of reference is about 50 percent for such witnesses, I did not calculate
the percentage on a per-witness basis.
The following example will illustrate the operation of the formula. As-
sume that through a review of the publicly available testimony, I deter-
mined that ten out of twenty-five prosecution witnesses testified seriously
inconsistently in a particular case. Assume also that, for three witnesses in
this case, some or all of their testimony occurred in camera. In particular,
assume that all of Witness A's testimony was held in camera, one-half of
Witness B's testimony, and one-tenth of Witness C's testimony was held in
camera. Assume also that the judgment in this case failed to reference the
serious inconsistences of 25 percent of the witnesses who we know (from
reading the publicly available transcripts) in fact testified seriously inconsis-
tently. Assume finally that for 4 percent of the witnesses in this case who
testified seriously inconsistently, the Trial Chamber referenced some but not
all of their serious inconsistencies. Assuming these facts, we would first ag-
gregate the proportion of cross-examination testimony for each witness that
was held in camera. The aggregation would look like this:
1 (Witness A)
+.5 (Witness B)
+.1 (Witness C)
Our sum is 1.6. We would also aggregate the percentage of witnesses whose
serious inconsistencies were not mentioned (which is 25 percent) and one
half of the percentage of Y&N witnesses (which is 2 percent) to reach 27
percent. Then we would multiply 1.6 by 27 percent to reach .432 and add
.432 to the number of witnesses who we know testified seriously inconsis-
tently in that case-here, ten. Adding .432 to ten leads to an adjusted esti-
mate of 10.43 witnesses who testified seriously inconsistently. Finally, on
these facts, the percentage of witnesses who testified seriously inconsistently
would increase from 40 percent (10/25) to 41.7 percent (10.43/25). I label
the former figure the "understated percentage of serious inconsistencies"
and the latter figure the "adjusted percentage of serious inconsistencies."
I used the adjusted percentage of serious inconsistencies for only two cal-
culations in my dataset. First, in reporting the percentage of witnesses who
testified seriously inconsistently, I presented both the understated and the
adjusted percentage of serious inconsistencies. Second, Graph I shows the
percentage of witnesses who testified seriously inconsistently over time, and
here, I also used the adjusted percentage of serious inconsistencies. For all
other calculations, I used the understated percentage of serious inconsisten-
cies. I did so primarily because virtually none of my other findings would
have changed had I used the adjusted percentage of serious inconsistencies.
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Most of my calculations relating to serious inconsistencies compared their
incidence in different populations of witnesses. So, for instance, I compared
the percentage of female and male witnesses who testified seriously inconsis-
tently and the percentage of Hutu and Tutsi witnesses who did so. Adding
an estimated percentage to account for the serious inconsistencies that likely
appeared in unavailable transcripts obviously increases the overall percentage
of witnesses who testified seriously inconsistently, but my calculations
showed that that increase is distributed close to evenly across the different
sub-populations.7 4 Even though the differences are not substantial, I would
have preferred to run regressions on the adjusted data, but because the re-
gressions require categorical data, not continuous data, I had to use the un-
derstated percentage of serious inconsistencies.75
4. Details Concerning Statements/Testimonies
In order to determine their influence on the incidence of serious inconsis-
tencies, I gathered data on the number and types of statements/testimonies
that witnesses made prior to testifying in the subject trial. Because pre-trial
statements are filed under seal, I was able to learn about them only by read-
ing the relevant judgments and transcripts. Unfortunately, this method al-
most certainly understated the number of statements/testimonies made by
witnesses because defense counsel typically mentioned them only when
cross-examining the witness about a perceived inconsistency between a par-
ticular statement and witness's current testimony. Thus, I had no way to
identify statements that defense counsel had no reason to mention. Based on
the representations of a defense counsel whom I interviewed,7 6 I did, how-
ever, assume that each witness made at least one pre-trial statement for the
ICTR.
I categorized the witnesses' previous statements/testimonies into five
groups: (1) pre-trial statements taken by ICTR investigators; (2) testimony
in previous ICTR cases; (3) statements and testimony taken in genocide
trials in Rwandan courts; (4) statements and testimony taken in genocide
trials in foreign courts; and (5) statements and testimony taken in gacaca
74. For example, I found the largest difference between the understated percentage of serious inconsis-
tencies and the adjusted percentage in my comparison on the basis of gender. In particular, the difference
between the understated percentage of serious inconsistencies and the adjusted percentage was .18 for
men and .27 for women. The differences for the other subpopulations-comprising the two ethnicities,
the accomplices/non-accomplices, and the imprisoned/non-imprisoned-were less than half the difference
for the two genders.
75. These regressions were trying to determine the effect of various factors, such as gender or ethnic-
ity, on the probability of a witness's testimony containing a serious inconsistency. Thus each observation
involved one witness, and that witness either did or did not have a serious inconsistency. To make such
calculations, the dependent variable must take on the value one for the existence of a serious inconsis-
tency and zero if not. This approach does not allow for values of the dependent variables that are fractions
between zero and one.
76. Skype Interview with Peter Robinson, Defense Counsel (June 16, 2015).
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proceedings in Rwanda.77 Ideally, I would have subdivided categories (3),
(4), and (5) and placed statements and testimony in each of these criminal
justice systems into separate categories of their own. I was unable to do so,
however, because the transcripts and judgments often did not provide suffi-
cient detail. In a typical cross-examination, for instance, defense counsel
might make reference to some allegations the witness previously made dur-
ing gacaca, but the discussion would be unclear as to whether the allegations
were made during a gacaca trial or in some sort of pre-trial statement. I do
not consider my inability to refine the data in this way to be problematic,
however, because my primary goal in considering this set of data was to
ascertain whether documents generated by some criminal justice systems
were more likely to give rise to inconsistencies than documents generated in
other criminal justice systems. The data answer that question, as I will de-
scribe in Part III.
5. The Trial Chambers' Assessments of Prosecution Witness Testimony
In considering the Trial Chambers' assessments of witness testimony, I
focused on their findings of witness credibility and their willingness to rely
on witness testimony. Although many scholars (and some judges) devote
considerable attention to probing the nuances of the distinction between
"credibility" and "reliability" and the relationship between those concepts
and the admissibility and weight of evidence,78 I use the following basic
definitions. "Credibility" is typically equated with truthfulness, such that a
witness who is testifying honestly can be deemed "credible." "Reliability,"
by contrast, can include credibility, but also encompasses the witness's abil-
ity to observe the events about which he or she is testifying.79 Sometimes
international tribunals appear to confuse credibility with reliability,80 but
for purposes of this Article, I took the Trial Chambers at their word. Thus, I
77. Rwandan courts were unable to handle the prosecution of all of the offenders arrested following
the genocide, so the Rwandan government adapted an indigenous dispute resolution process known as
gacaca into a method for prosecuting genocide. PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA 55-63 (2010).
78. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, Decision on Motion for Acquit-
tal, para. 7 (July 3, 2000); MARK KLAMBERG, EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: CON-
FRONTING LEGAL GAPS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED EVENTS 351-57 (2013); Mark
Klamberg, General Requirements for the Admission of Evidence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1016, 1025-29 (Gbran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013); RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE
WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 107-11 (2002).
79. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brcanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 25 (Sept. 1, 2004); CDF
Judgment, supra note 30, at para. 257; Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment,
para. 487 (Mar. 2, 2009); KLAMBERG, EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 78, at
174-77; Klamberg, General Requirements for the Admission ofEvidence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 78, at 1025; Groome, supra note 13, at 19 n.49.
80. See, e.g., Seromba Judgment, supra note 60, at para. 65 (finding that YAT's testimony "cannot be
deemed credible" because "the information which was disclosed to him [was) not supported by any other
evidence"). Such confusion is not confined to ICTR Trial Chambers. See, e g., Prosecutor v. Naletelid &
Martinovid, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgment, para. 402 (May 3, 2006); KLAMBERG, EVIDENCE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 78, at 174 (providing additional examples); Klamberg, Gen-
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classified a witness as credible if the Trial Chamber deemed the witness's
testimony to be "credible," even if I suspected-based on the Trial Cham-
ber's additional commentary-that it was, or should have been, referring to
reliability.
For purposes of this study, I characterized the Trial Chamber as finding a
witness credible or not credible when the Trial Chamber either expressly
stated that it found the witness to be credible or not credible,," or when it
was absolutely clear from the context and Trial Chambers' other findings
about the witness that it considered the witness credible or not credible. For
nearly 6 percent of witnesses, I categorized the Trial Chambers' findings as
"yes and no," because the Trial Chamber expressly found the witness credi-
ble in some respects or for some purposes but not credible in other respects
or for other purposes. For instance, the Renzaho Trial Chamber generally
treated the testimony of witness ALG with caution, finding that "his evi-
dence may have been influenced by a wish to positively affect the proceed-
ings against him in Rwanda." 8 2 In part for that reason, no doubt, the Trial
Chamber did not find witness ALG credible with respect to his allegations
about the dismissal of Conseiller C61estin Sezibera. 3 Yet, it did find him to
be "consistent and credible" when it came to his testimony regarding
Renzaho's meetings in late February and early March.8 4 Finally, I was forced
to withhold a credibility assessment for 16 percent of witnesses because the
Trial Chambers simply did not provide sufficient information for me to de-
termine whether they found these witnesses credible or not.
Classifying the Trial Chambers' reliance on testimony was more compli-
cated. First, for each witness, I identified all of the allegations that the pros-
ecution sought to prove through a particular witness's testimony. Thus, if
the witness testified that the defendant spoke at a rally on April 10th, and
delivered weapons on April 11th, and participated in a massacre on April
12th, then I listed each of these three allegations, and I determined whether
the Trial Chamber relied on the witness's testimony to prove each of the
three allegations. Each allegation, therefore, generated a yes or "no" en-
try. For most allegations, the classification was straightforward because the
Trial Chamber clearly relied on the witness's testimony in finding the alle-
gation to be proved or rejected the witness's testimony in finding the allega-
tion not proved. These allegations generated a "true" "yes" or "no" entry.
In addition, however, some allegations generated a "yes"-because the Trial
Chamber relied on the witness's testimony to prove the allegation-or a
eral Requirements for the Admission of Evidence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 78, at
1025 (providing additional examples).
81. See, e.g., Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 84; Karera Judgment, supra note 15, at
para. 135; Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55, at para. 416; Secomba Judgment, supra note 60, at
paras. 240-42.
82. Renzaho Judgment, supra note 59, at para. 113 n.137.
83. See id. at paras. 494, 496.
84. Id. at para. 113.
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"no"-because the Trial Chamber did not-but the reasons underlying
those findings undermined the technical classification. For instance, a Trial
Chamber might find an allegation about which the witness testified not
proven but only because the witness's testimony did not match the prosecu-
tion's allegation. 8' That is, the witness testified as to X, and even though
the Trial Chamber may have believed the witness as to X, it did not matter
because the existence of X did not support allegation Y that the prosecution
was seeking to prove. These allegations generated a "no" entry because,
technically speaking, the Trial Chamber did not rely on the witness's testi-
mony to prove the allegation, but I included explanatory notes to make clear
that the Trial Chamber's failure to rely on the witness's testimony did not
stem from concerns about the witness's credibility or the reliability of her
testimony but rather stemmed from a mismatch between the testimony and
the allegation. The converse situation also regularly arose with respect to
"yes" entries. Here, most commonly, a Trial Chamber would find proven
the allegation about which the witness testified, but it would make clear
that it did so only because the witness's testimony was corroborated by other
(ostensibly more credible or reliable) testimony.86 So, this allegation would
generate a "yes" entry because, technically speaking, the Trial Chamber did
rely on the witness's testimony to prove an allegation, but my comments
would provide valuable contextual information about the nature of the
yes.
The explanatory information was important because I next considered, as
a whole, all of the entries for all of the allegations for a particular witness.
Taking all of the entries and explanations into account, I categorized each
witness with one of the following four labels: "yes," "no," "yes and no,"
and "?." I classified a witness as a "yes" if one of the following three situa-
tions existed: (1) the Trial Chamber relied on the witness's testimony to find
proved all of the relevant allegations; (2) the Trial Chamber relied on the
witness's testimony to prove the overwhelming majority of relevant allega-
85. See, e.g., Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 59, at para. 230 (finding that even though defendant
provided witness with a laissez-passer, "the Chamber heard no evidence that the Accused also issued
laissez-passer to soldiers, Interahamwe, armed civilians or any other members of an alleged joint criminal
enterprise"); Muhimana Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 60-61 (finding that the witness's testimony
fell "outside the scope" of the Indictment); Niyitegeka Judgment, supra note 15, at paras. 273, 287
(finding that even though witness saw the Accused, heard a gunshot, and saw two people dead, the
witness did not see who fired the gun or where the gunshot came from, so "there is insufficient evidence
in support of the allegation that the Accused killed the man and woman"); Setako Judgment, supra note
59, at paras. 409-410 (finding that there was widespread looting in Kigali but there was no "admissible
evidence of Setako ordering or encouraging militiamen or soldiers in Kigali who committed looting").
86. See, e.g., Gatere Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 341 (finding testimony of Witnesses BBJ and
BCS "consistent and compelling ... to the extent that they are corroborated"); Kanyarukiga Judgment,
supra note 66, at para. 440 (noting that "Witnesses CBK, CBT, CDK and YAU are regarded with
caution by the Chamber, particularly without corroboration" but their testimonies are corroborated by
three other witnesses "regarded as credible"); Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55, at para. 415 (finding
testimony by Witnesses MM and MP identifying the Accused to be reliable though based on hearsay
"because Munyakazi's role is corroborated by Witnesses LCQ and BWW").
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tions; or (3) some of the allegations relevant to the witness were classified as
"no," but they were technical "no's" as described above and did not reflect
any Trial Chamber concerns about the witness's credibility or the reliability
of her testimony. Similarly, I classified witnesses as a "no" if one of the
following three situations existed: (1) the Trial Chamber did not rely on the
witness's testimony and rejected all of the relevant allegations; (2) the Trial
Chamber did not rely on the witness's testimony and rejected the over-
whelming majority of relevant allegations; or (3) some of the allegations
relevant to the witness were classified as "yes," but they were technical
"yeses" as described above and did not reflect the Trial Chamber's positive
assessment of the witness's credibility or the reliability of her testimony. I
classified a witness as "yes and no" when the Trial Chambers relied on some
but not all of the witness's testimony to prove allegations. Finally, and very
rarely, I classified a witness as "?" when the Trial Chamber simply did not
provide enough information for me to determine whether they had relied on
the witness's testimony in proving or rejecting an allegation. I classified
only two witnesses of the 342 in the dataset as
6. Other Data
My remaining data-gathering needs little explanation. I gathered data
about the witnesses' gender, ethnicity, imprisonment status, and accomplice
status from the transcripts and judgments. I calculated the time between the
subject testimony and the pre-trial statements/testimonies in months, and I
rounded to the nearest month. Thus, I classified a statement dated between
the first and fifteenth day of a month as occurring during that month,
whereas I classified a statement occurring on the sixteenth day or later as
occurring during the following month.
III. SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES: THE WHO, WHAT, WHERE, AND
WHEN OF TESTIMONY THAT DIVERGES FROM
PREVIOUS REPRESENTATIONS
A. The Incidence of Serious Inconsistencies
Inconsistencies appearing in ICTR testimony pertain to a wide range of
topics including facts about the crime itself, facts about the defendant's par-
ticipation in the crime, and facts relating to the witness's observation of the
events in question.8 7 Part II.A explained the significance of inconsistencies
in international criminal fact-finding. Part III will provide a comprehensive
picture of those inconsistencies, starting with their incidence. The data re-
veal that 67 percent of witnesses in the dataset testified in a way that was
inconsistent to some degree with the witnesses' previous statements/testimo-
87. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 106-18.
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nies. When we consider only inconsistencies that are serious, the percentage
declines, though not dramatically so. The available transcripts and judg-
ments show that 42 percent of witnesses testify in a way that is seriously
inconsistent with their pre-trial statements/testimonies. When I adjusted
the data to account for testimony held in camera,"8 the percentage of wit-
nesses who testified seriously inconsistently rose to 48 percent.
B. Variation in Serious Inconsistencies Over Time
Graph 1 depicts the incidence of serious inconsistencies over time. Both
the graph and a logit regression showed no statistically significant time
trend, so we must assume that the incidence of serious inconsistencies re-
mained constant throughout the ICTR's life.89
GRAPH 1: SHOWING CHRONOLOGICAL INCIDENCE
OF SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES
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C. Serious Inconsistencies by Gender and Ethnicity
In order to isolate factors that might predict serious inconsistencies, I
gathered a large quantity of data about the 342 witnesses in my dataset. 90 I
coded witnesses by gender, for instance, and learned that roughly equal pro-
portions of men and women testify seriously inconsistently (38 percent for
women and 44 percent for men). There is a slightly greater difference in the
incidence of serious inconsistencies between the two ethnic groups (41 per-
88. For an explanation of that adjustment, see supra Part II.B.3.(b).
89. See Logit Regression 1: Explaining Serious Inconsistencies by Comprehensive Set of Explanatory
Variables, infra app. 1.
90. As noted in Part II.B.3.b., all of the findings discussed henceforth in this Part are derived from
the understated percentage of serious inconsistencies.
\1
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cent for Tutsi and 48 percent for Hutu), but it is not as substantial a differ-
ence as one might expect. Combining gender and ethnicity, however, did
reveal an interesting disparity. In particular, whereas the incidence of serious
inconsistencies among male Hutu witnesses was roughly equal to that of
male Tutsi witnesses (47 percent for male Hutu compared to 44 percent for
male Tutsi), a far greater proportion of female Hutu witnesses testified seri-
ously inconsistently (71 percent) than female Tutsi witnesses (36 percent).
When we take additional factors in account, however, some of the differ-
ences I have just described disappear. A logit regression seeking to explain
variation in serious inconsistencies that included not only gender and
ethnicity but also a series of other potentially relevant factors,9 ' shows no
statistically significant relationship between gender and serious inconsisten-
cies or between ethnicity and serious inconsistencies. However, the regres-
sion does confirm that Hutu women are substantially more likely to testify
seriously inconsistently than witnesses of any other gender-ethnic combina-
tion, and this result is statistically significant. The sample size of Hutu wo-
men witnesses is quite small, 92 however, so this finding may be somewhat
imprecise.
D. Serious Inconsistencies by Imprisonment and Accomplice Status
The tabular data suggests a correlation between a witness's accomplice or
imprisonment status and his likelihood of testifying seriously inconsistently.
Specifically, whereas 60 percent of accomplices testified seriously inconsis-
tently, only 40 percent of non-accomplices did so. However, the logit re-
gression,93 which factored in a comprehensive set of explanatory variables,
showed that accomplice status had no effect on the probability of a witness
testifying seriously inconsistently. The tabular data shows even greater ap-
parent divergences among witnesses based on their imprisonment status. I
classified witnesses into three groups: (1) witnesses who had never been im-
prisoned for genocide crimes; (2) witnesses who had been imprisoned for
genocide crimes but had been released; and (3) witnesses who had been im-
prisoned for genocide crimes and were still in prison at the time they testi-
fied. The data showed that only 38 percent of witnesses who were never
imprisoned testified seriously inconsistently whereas 52 percent of witnesses
imprisoned during trial did. Moreover, a whopping 75 percent of witnesses
who were imprisoned but released before trial testified seriously inconsis-
91. These additional factors are the witnesses' accomplice status, imprisonment status, the number of
pretrial statements/testimonies provided by each witness, and the starting date of the trial.
92. Of 342 witnesses, only seven were Hutu women.
93. Logic regressions differ from linear regressions because in a logit regression the dependent variable
that a modeler is trying to explain is a percentage between zero and one. Regular linear regression
("ordinary least squares," or OLS) cannot guarantee that the predicted value of the dependent variable
will fall between zero and one for all values of the explanatory variables. Logit regressions use a special,
non-linear function form to achieve this end, and must be estimated with maximum likelihood methods
instead of OLS.
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tently. Again, however, the logit regression showed that when we include
other relevant explanatory variables, a witness's imprisonment status had no
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of finding a serious inconsis-
tency in his testimony.9 4
E. Serious Inconsistencies by Number and Type of Pretrial Statement/Testimony
Table 6 shows the relationship between the number of statements/testi-
monies witnesses provided and the percentage of serious inconsistencies in
the population of witnesses who provided that number of statements/
testimonies.
TABLE 6: PROBABILITY OF SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES BASED ON THE
NUMBER OF PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS/TESTIMONIES PROVIDED
BY A WITNESS
Number of Witnesses
in the Dataset who
Number of Pre-trial % of Witnesses with that Provided that
Statements/ Number of Statements/ Number of
Testimonies Provided Testimonies who Testified Statements/
by a Witness Seriously Inconsistently Testimonies
1 2496 172
2 48%7 77
3 62%1 38
4 67% 18
5 75%1 8
6 7991 14
7 100% 6
8 33%7 3
9 100%7 3
10 100%7 1
16 100%7 1
As Table 6 indicates, an increased number of pretrial statements/testimo-
nies is correlated with a dramatically increased incidence of serious inconsis-
tencies. Indeed, merely increasing pretrial statements/testimonies from one
to two doubles the proportion of witnesses who testif seriously inconsis-
tently. Admittedly, the number of witnesses who provided more than six
statements/testimonies is small, so that could reduce our confidence in that
94. See Logir Regression 1: Explaining Serious Inconsistencies by Comprehensive Set of Explanatory
Variables, infra app. 1.
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particular result, but the logit regression shows a highly statistically signifi-
cant effect for the number of documents. In particular, the regression shows
that for each of the first four statements or testimonies, adding a statement/
testimony raises the probability of a serious inconsistency by approximately
11 percent. Adding more statements/testimonies continues to increase the
probability of serious inconsistencies, but to a lesser degree as the number of
statements/testimonies increases.95
Overall, 33 percent of statements/testimonies gave rise to serious incon-
sistencies, but these were not evenly distributed across the different kinds of
statements/testimonies. For instance, statements/testimonies submitted to
foreign courts generated the smallest proportion of serious inconsistencies
whereas statements/testimonies submitted to Rwandan courts generated the
largest. The specific percentages are shown in Table 7 below.
TABLE 7: SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES BY DOCUMENT TYPE
Percentage of those Documents Found
Seriously Inconsistent with ICTR
Type of Document Testimony in the Subject Trial
Rwandan Court Statements/Testimonies 42%
Gacaca Statements/Testimonies 35%
ICTR Pre-Trial Statements 31%
Testimony in Previous ICTR Cases 30%
Foreign court Statements/Testimonies 9 6  22%
All Documents Combined 33%
I next considered whether the incidence of serious inconsistencies in the
different types of statements/testimonies had changed during the lifespan of
the ICTR. I did not consider potential time trends for foreign court state-
ments/testimonies-because the sample size was too small-or for gacaca
statements/testimonies-because gacaca proceedings were not fully under-
way until many of the trials in my dataset had already concluded. However,
Graph 2 shows the chronological incidence of serious inconsistencies with
ICTR pre-trial statements, ICTR previous testimony, and Rwandan court
statements/testimonies. A simple regression of serious inconsistency by doc-
ument type over time suggested no statistically significant time trend for
95. In particular, adding a fifth document for a witness who already has four raises the probability of a
serious inconsistency by 9 percent. Adding a sixth raises the probability by 7 percent; adding a seventh
raises the probability by 5 percent, and adding an eighth raises the probability by 3 percent. According
to the tabular data, witnesses who have provided nine or more statements or testimonies are 100 percent
likely to testify seriously inconsistently with one of them. See Marginal Effects Calculation 1: Effects of
the Number of Statements/Testimonies on Serious Inconsistencies as Estimated by Logit Regression 1,
infra app. 1.
96. The dataset included only nine pre-trial statements/testimonies from foreign courts, so this
finding is less precise than the others.
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testimony that was seriously inconsistent with ICTR pre-trial statements.9 7
However, the regression did suggest a statistically significant downward
trend for testimony that was seriously inconsistent with previous ICTR tes-
timony and a statistically significant upward trend for testimony that was
seriously inconsistent with Rwandan court statements/testimonies. Specifi-
cally, the regressions suggested that the percentage of serious inconsistencies
in previous ICTR testimony decreased by an average of 2.6 percent per year
while the percentage of serious inconsistencies in Rwandan court state-
ments/testimonies increased by an average of 4 percent per year.98 As al-
ready noted, the data shows no statistically significant time trend for serious
inconsistencies across the whole dataset, but it does reveal subcategory
trends that offset one another.
GRAPH 2: SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES IN
DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATEMENTS/TESTIMONIES OVER TIME 99
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F. Serious Inconsistencies by Length of Time between Statements/Testimonies and
the Subject Testimony
Finally, I considered whether the length of time between the pretrial
statement/testimony and the subject testimony predicted serious inconsis-
tencies. I expected that witnesses were more likely to testify seriously incon-
97. See Simple Regression 1: Serious Inconsistencies Over Time, by Document Types, infra app. 1.
98. Id.
99. Note that there is missing data for some document types at some trials. For example, in Graph 2,
we can see that for many trials there were no witnesses who had previously testified in an ICTR case.
Such missing data is the reason that a number of the graphs in the remainder of this Article have missing
stretches and isolated markers.
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sistently with old statements/testimonies than with more recent ones. The
data does not bear out that expectation, however. Table 8 and Graph 3 show
the probability of serious inconsistencies for statements/testimonies that
were provided over various time periods. The data shows that ICTR testi-
mony is less likely to seriously diverge from very recent statements/testi-
mony, but after that, the probability of serious inconsistencies does not
increase as more time elapses between statements/testimonies and the sub-
ject testimony.
TABLE 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES AND THE
LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE STATEMENT/TESTIMONY AND
THE SUBJECT TESTIMONY
Number of
Statements! % of Statements!
Length of Time Testimonies in Testimonies in
Between Subject this Time Period this Time Period
Testimony and with which Total Number of with which
Pre-Trial Subject Testimony Statements/ Subject Testimony
Statement/ Is Seriously Testimonies in Is Seriously
Testimony Inconsistent this Time Period Inconsistent
Less than one year 11 47 23%
1-2 years 20 54 37%7
2-3 years 25 48 5 2%Y
3-4 years 17 39 4491
4-5 years 22 60 37%
5-6 years 23 45 51%7
6-7 years 21 46 46%
7-8 years 16 38 42%
8-9 years 17 39 44%
9-10 years 38 97 39%
10-12 years 20 1 44 45%7
13+ years 11 47 23%1
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GRAPH 3: SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES
AND LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE STATEMENT/TESTIMONY
AND THE SUBJECT TESTIMONY
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IV. ASSESSING TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF THE
ICTR's CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATIONS
Reading numerous ICTR judgments has led me to expect that certain
factors would be statistically significant predictors of Trial Chambers' credi-
bility and reliability findings. As this section reveals, the data supports some
of my expectations but by no means all. Table 9 begins the discussion by
displaying the percentages of witnesses across the entire dataset whom the
Trial Chambers found wholly or partially credible and on whose testimony
the Trial Chambers wholly or partially relied.
TABLE 9: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS
Credibility Relied Upon
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony
% of Witnesses % of Witnesses Whose Testimony was Totally or
Found Totally Found Totally or was Totally Relied Partially Relied
Credible Partially Credible Upon Upon
55% 61% 37% 57%
A. The Trial Chambers' Assessments of Witness Testimony over Time
This section reports one of this Article's most notable findings: that the
Trial Chambers' willingness to find prosecution witnesses credible and to
rely on their testimony declined significantly over time. This finding comes
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as no surprise to anyone who has read many ICTR judgments. Early judg-
ments feature fewer discussions of witness credibility and reliability than
later judgments, and what discussions there are in the early judgments are
less detailed and in-depth. In addition, in early cases, Trial Chambers
seemed more likely to explain away serious inconsistencies and other testi-
monial deficiencies than they did in later cases. The data confirms my im-
pressionistic sense that Trial Chambers treated prosecution witness
testimony more skeptically as time passed.
Graph 4 depicts the Trial Chambers' positive total and partial credibility
findings over time, and Graph 5 depicts the Trial Chambers' willingness to
totally and partially rely on prosecution testimony over time.
GRAPH 4: CHRONOLOGICALLY SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF WITNESSES
TRIAL CHAMBERS FOUND WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY CREDIBLE
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GRAPH 5: CHRONOLOGICALLY SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF WITNESSES
WHOSE TESTIMONY TRIAL CHAMBERS RELIED ON
IN WHOLE OR IN PART
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A simple regression of credibility on time confirms a statistically signifi-
cant downward time trend. In particular, simple regressions suggest that the
Trial Chambers' positive total credibility findings declined on average by
2.1 percent per year, 00 and their positive total or partial credibility findings
declined on average by 2.0 percent per year.10 1 Similarly, the simple regres-
sions suggest that the Trial Chambers' willingness to totally rely on a prose-
cution witness's testimony declined by an average of 2.4 percent per year,1 0 2
whereas their willingness to totally or partially rely on a prosecution wit-
ness's testimony declined by an average of 2.1 percent per year.103 In an
effort to account for the effect of other factors, I included a timing variable
in a logit regression featuring a comprehensive set of other explanatory vari-
ables. It confirms the statistically significant negative time trend, showing
that if we fix other variables at their average values, the passage of time,
isolated, reduced by 51 percent the likelihood that a Trial Chamber would
100. See Simple Regression 2: Trial Chambers' Findings of Total Credibility Over Time, infra app. 2.
For all of the simple regressions, the calculations are based on the mean value of independent variables.
101. See Simple Regression 3: Trial Chambers' Findings of Total and Partial Credibility Over Time,
infra app. 2.
102. See Simple Regression 4: Trial Chambers' Total Reliance on Testimony Over Time, infra app. 2.
103. See Simple Regression 5: Trial Chambers' Total and Partial Reliance on Testimony Over Time,
infra app. 2.
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find a witness totally credible,1 0 4 and it reduced by 46 percent the likelihood
that a Trial Chamber would find a witness totally or partially credible. 0 5
Put another way, during the first trial in the dataset, a witness, who was
average in every other respect, had a 97 percent chance of being found to-
tally credible and a 99 percent chance of being found totally or partially
credible. By the last trial in the dataset, that same witness had only a 46
percent chance of being found totally credible and a 53 percent chance of
being found totally or partially credible. The logit regression produced simi-
lar findings regarding the Trial Chambers' willingness to rely on prosecu-
tion witness testimony. That is, if we fix all other variables at their average
values, the passage of time, isolated, reduced the Trial Chambers' willing-
ness to wholly rely on a witness's testimony by 58 percent 0 6 and to wholly
or partially rely on the witness's testimony by 51 percent. 0 7 That is, during
the first trial in the dataset, a witness, who was average in every other re-
spect, had an 81 percent chance of having her testimony wholly relied upon,
and a 97 percent chance of having her testimony totally or partially relied
upon. By the last trial in the dataset, that same witness had only a 23 per-
cent chance of having her testimony totally relied upon and a 46 percent
chance of having her testimony totally or partially relied upon.
B. The Trial Chambers' Assessment of Witness Testimony
by Gender and Ethnicity
The tabular data shows that Trial Chambers found a higher proportion of
female witnesses credible than male, and that they were slightly more will-
ing to rely on the testimony of female witnesses. Table 10 shows the compa-
rable proportions. The divergence between the genders is greatest when we
consider those witnesses whom the Trial Chamber found wholly credible or
whose testimony the Trial Chamber wholly relied upon. Indeed, when we
include witnesses who are found partially credible or whose testimony is
partially relied upon, the divergence in the Trial Chambers' treatment of the
two genders narrows substantially, in the case of credibility, and disappears
entirely, in the case of reliance.
104. See Logit Regression 2: Trial Chambers' Total Credibility Findings by Comprehensive Set of
Explanatory Variables, infra app. 3.
105. See Logit Regression 3: Trial Chambers' Total and Partial Credibility Findings by Comprehen-
sive Set of Explanatory Variables, infra app. 3.
106. See Logit Regression 4: Trial Chambers' Total Reliance on Testimony by Comprehensive Set of
Explanatory Variables, infra apps. 3-4.
107. See Logit Regression 5: Trial Chambers' Total and Partial Reliance on Testimony by Comprehen-
sive Set of Explanatory Variables, infra app. 5.
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TABLE 10: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIANCE
FINDINGS BY GENDER
Gender Credibility Relied Upon
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony was
% of Witnesses Found Wholly Testimony was Wholly or
Found Wholly or Partially Wholly Relied Partially Relied
Credible Credible Upon Upon
Female 64% 66% 43% 58%
Male 52% 59% 35% 57%
Turning next to ethnicity, tabular data suggests that Trial Chambers re-
garded Tutsi witnesses as more credible and that Trial Chambers were more
likely to rely on their testimony, as Table 11 shows. As with gender, the
ostensible disparities decreased when findings of partial credibility and par-
tial reliance were included, but some disparity remained.
TABLE 11: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIANCE FINDINGS
BY ETHNICITY
Ethnicity Credibility Relied Upon
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony was
% of Witnesses Found Wholly Testimony was Wholly or
Found Wholly or Partially Wholly Relied Partially Relied
Credible Credible Upon Upon
Hutu 45% 53% 29% 53%
Tutsi 60% 65% 43% 61%
Combining gender and ethnicity compounded whatever divergence ap-
peared when we compared the characteristics separately. That is, the tabular
data above indicates that Trial Chambers were slightly more likely to find
female witnesses credible and to rely on their testimony than male witnesses;
it likewise indicated that Trial Chambers were slightly more likely to find
Tutsi witnesses credible and to rely on their testimony than Hutu witnesses.
Therefore, Table 12 unsurprisingly shows that Trial Chambers are most
likely to find credible and to rely on the testimony of Tutsi female witnesses
and least likely to find credible and to rely on the testimony of Hutu male
witnesses. That said, the differences are relatively small. Moreover, when I
factored in other relevant explanatory variables in a logit regression, the
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effect disappeared. The regression revealed no statistically significant effect
for gender, ethnicity, or the gender-ethnic combination. 0 8
TABLE 12: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIANCE FINDINGS BY
GENDER-ETHNIC COMBINATIONS
Gender-Ethnic
Combinations Credibility Relied Upon
% of
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony was
Witnesses Found Wholly Testimony was Wholly or
Found Wholly or Partially Wholly Relied Partially Relied
Credible Credible Upon Upon
Hutu Female 57% 57% 29% 57%
Tutsi Female 64% 67% 45% 59%
Hutu Male 44% 53% 29% 52%
Tutsi Male 58% 64% 41% 62%
Finally, I considered what role, if any, gender or ethnicity played in the
Trial Chambers' credibility or reliability determinations over time. We
know that the Trial Chambers' positive credibility and reliability findings
declined over time for the whole population of witnesses in the dataset, but
here I sought to determine if that decline varied by gender or ethnicity.
Graphs 6 through 13 provide a chronological depiction of the Trial Cham-
bers' credibility and reliability findings by gender and ethnicity. Graphs 6
through 9 show the Trial Chambers' total and partial credibility findings by
gender followed by the Trial Chambers' total and partial reliability findings
by gender. Graphs 10 through 13 show the same variables by ethnicity.
108. See Logit Regressions 2, 3, 4, and 5, infra apps. 3-5.
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GRAPH 6: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL CREDIBILITY FINDINGS BY
GENDER OVER TIME
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GRAPH 7: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL AND PARTIAL CREDIBILITY
FINDINGS BY GENDER OVER TIME
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GRAPH 8: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL RELIANCE ON WITNESS
TESTIMONY BY GENDER OVER TIME
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GRAPH 9: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL OR PARTIAL RELIANCE ON
WITNESS TESTIMONY BY GENDER OVER TIME
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GRAPH 10: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
BY ETHNICITY OVER TIME
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GRAPH 11: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL OR PARTIAL CREDIBILITY
FINDINGS BY ETHNICITY OVER TIME
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GRAPH 12: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL RELIANCE ON WITNESS
TESTIMONY BY ETHNICITY OVER TIME
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GRAPH 13: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL AND PARTIAL RELIANCE
ON WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ETHNICITY OVER TIME
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The graphs show what appears to be unexplained variation in the sample,
but some simple regressions suggest several interesting time trends. In par-
ticular, the regressions examined the effect of gender on the four different
categories of Trial Chambers' findings over time (that also appear in the
graphs):
(1) Witnesses found totally credible;
(2) Witnesses found totally or partially credible;
(3) Witnesses whose testimony was totally relied upon; and
(4) Witnesses whose testimony was totally or partially relied upon.
The most interesting results relate to witnesses in category 1, those found
totally credible. There, I found a substantial-and statistically significant-
difference in the Trial Chambers' findings over time by gender. In particu-
lar, the simple regression suggested that, although the Trial Chambers' will-
ingness to find male witnesses totally credible declined by an average of 2.8
percent per year, it stayed virtually the same for female witnesses.' 09 Simple
regressions on the other three categories also suggested a similar-though
smaller-divergence between male and female witnesses; this conclusion is
less certain, as the findings for the female witnesses are not statistically sig-
nificant. With respect to male witnesses, the regression showed a statisti-
cally significant decline in the Trial Chambers' willingness to find them
totally or partially credible and to rely on their testimony in whole or in
part. The average decline is fairly similar across each of the three categories:
between 2.3 and 2.5 percent per year.11 0 With respect to female witnesses,
there appeared to be no decline in the Trial Chambers' willingness to find
witnesses totally or partially credible, whereas the regression suggested that
the Trial Chambers' categories 3 and 4 findings for female witnesses de-
clined by 1.7 percent and 1.3 percent per year, respectively."' As noted,
however, the findings of categories 2, 3, and 4 for female witnesses were not
statistically significant.
The regressions also showed divergences in the Trial Chambers' treatment
of the testimony of the two ethnic groups over time. In particular, the Trial
Chambers' willingness to credit Hutu witnesses and to rely on their testi-
mony declined much more substantially than the concomitant decline for
Tutsi witnesses. The regressions showed the greatest divergence in the Trial
Chambers' credibility findings. In particular, the Trial Chambers' positive
total credibility findings and their positive total and partial credibility find-
ings declined by an average of 4.4 percent and 4.5 percent per year, respec-
tively, for Hutu witnesses whereas they declined by an average of only 1.1
109. Summary 1: Simple Regression Statistics for Credibility Findings Over Time by Gender, infra
app. 6.
110. Id.; Summary 2: Simple Regression Statistics for Reliance Findings Over Time by Gender, infra
app. 6.
111. Summary 1, supra note 109; Summary 2, supra note 110.
93
Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 58
percent and 1 percent per year, respectively, for Tutsi witnesses. 11 2 The Trial
Chambers' reliance on witness testimony also declined over time at a greater
rate for Hutu witnesses, but these divergences were not as substantial or as
certain."'
C. The Trial Chambers' Assessment of Witness Testimony by Accomplice Status
and Imprisonment Status
One gets the impression from ICTR judgments that Trial Chambers cast
a skeptical eye on the testimony of witnesses who were accomplices and
witnesses who have been imprisoned for genocide crimes. Trial Chambers
frequently note the various motivations that accomplice or imprisoned wit-
nesses have to falsely inculpate defendants,1 4 and they frequently claim to
treat such witnesses' testimony "with caution.""' These sorts of comments
could lead a reader to believe that Trial Chambers were less likely to find
accomplices and imprisoned witnesses credible and less likely to rely on
their testimony. The tabular data is in keeping with that assumption. As
Table 13 shows, when it comes to witnesses who were never imprisoned for
genocide crimes, the Trial Chambers found them credible and relied on their
testimony in much higher proportions than they did witnesses who have
been imprisoned for genocide crimes. Indeed, Trial Chambers totally relied
on the testimony of witnesses who have never been imprisoned at approxi-
mately twice the rate that they did for imprisoned witnesses, though the
divergence narrowed when witnesses whom the Trial Chambers found par-
tially credible or whose testimony they relied on in part were included.
The tabular data for the Trial Chambers' treatment of accomplice wit-
nesses shows a similar pattern. This is not surprising, as the population of
witnesses who are accomplices overlaps substantially with the population of
112. Summary 3: Simple Regression Statistics for Credibility Findings Over Time by Ethnicity, infra
app. 6.
113. Summary 4: Simple Regression Statistics for Reliance Findings Over Time by Ethnicity, infra
app. 6. Specifically, the Trial Chambers' total reliance on the testimony of Hutu witnesses and its total or
partial reliance on their testimony declined by a statistically significant average of 2.7 percent and 3.4
percent per year, respectively. The corresponding declines for Tutsi witnesses appeared to be 1.4 percent
and 1.1 percent per year, though these were not statistically significant. Id
114. See, e.g., Nizeyimana Judgment, supra note 59, at paras. 111, 413, 441, 504, 559-560, 607,
820-821, 836-837, 1110, 1138-1139; Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 1276, 1344,
1348, 1480; Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 66, at paras. 468, 576, 578.
115. See, e.g., Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 86; Gatete Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 405; Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 59, at paras. 278, 449, 547, 552; Kanyarukiga Judg-
ment, supra note 66, at paras. 181, 198, 306, 440-441, 452-453, 487, 576, 591; KareraJudgment, supra
note 15, at paras. 52, 165, 189, 215; Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55, at paras. 10, 119, 199, 206,
255, 366, 417; NdahimanaJudgment, supra note 58, at paras. 48-49, 248-249, 443, 454, 459-61, 631,
687; Ngirabatware Judgment, supra note 57, at paras. 66, 193, 201, 283, 311, 479; Nizeyimana Judg-
ment, supra note 59, at paras. 113, 504, 560, 608, 621, 811, 820, 836-838, 1107; Ntawukulilyayo
Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 199, 219, 233, 266, 434; Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 58, at
paras. 226, 1064, 1142, 1210, 1276, 1348, 1447, 1480; Renzaho Judgment, supra note 59, at paras.
166, 240, 312, 321, 410, 487, 557, 569, 594, 652, 734; Setako Judgment, supra note 59, at paras. 50,
72, 167, 200, 203, 250, 264, 339, 348, 367, 424.
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witnesses imprisoned for genocide crimes. In particular, Trial Chambers are
approximately twice as likely to find non-accomplice witnesses credible and
to rely on their testimony as they are accomplice witnesses. Again, however,
the disparity narrowed when witnesses found to be partially credible or
whose testimony is partially relied upon were included.
TABLE 13: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIANCE FINDINGS BY
IMPRISONMENT STATUS AND ACCOMPLICE STATUS
Imprisonment
Status and
Accomplice
Status Credibility Relied Upon
% of
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony was
Witnesses Found Wholly Testimony was Wholly or
Found Wholly or Partially Wholly Relied Partially
Credible Credible Upon Relied Upon
Never
Imprisoned for 60% 65% 41% 60%
Genocide
Imprisoned for
Genocide hutGeocd bt35% 40% 20% 30%Released Before
Trial
Imprisoned for
Genocide and 39% 50% 23% 56%
Still Detained at
Trial
Not an
Accomplice to 61% 65% 42% 60%
the Defendant
Accomplice to 34% 46% 18% 48%
the Defendant
Given this tabular data, along with the Trial Chambers' skeptical com-
ments about the testimony of accomplice and imprisoned witnesses, I ex-
pected that a regression would confirm that these two characteristics had a
statistically significant effect on the Trial Chambers' findings. However, the
logit regression took account of a comprehensive set of variables and did not
show a statistically significant effect either for accomplice status or impris-
onment status.116
116. See Logit Regressions 2, 3, 4, and 5, infra apps. 3-5.
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I next sought to ascertain whether imprisonment status may have influ-
enced the Trial Chambers' credibility and reliability decisions over time.
Graphs 14 through 17 chronologically depict the tabular data on that
question.
GRAPH 14: CHRONOLOGICALLY SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS BY IMPRISONMENT STATUS
10
90
80
70
60
50 -
40
30
20
10
0
r& 0 C, & lb l.
-U-Never Imprisoned -o-Imprisoned but Released
96
Jrnprisoned at Trial
2017 / Grave Crimes and Weak Evidence
GRAPH 15: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL AND PARTIAL
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS BY IMPRISONMENT STATUS OVER TIME
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GRAPH 16: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL RELIANCE ON WITNESS
TESTIMONY BY IMPRISONMENT STATUS OVER TIME
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GRAPH 17: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL OR PARTIAL RELIANCE
ON WITNESS TESTIMONY BY IMPRISONMENT
STATUS OVER TIME
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Simple regressions reveal some interesting time trends. I categorized the
Trial Chambers' findings into the same four categories discussed above in
subsection B, namely:
(1) Witnesses found totally credible;
(2) Witnesses found totally or partially credible;
(3) Witnesses whose testimony was totally relied upon; and
(4) Witnesses whose testimony was totally or partially relied upon.
I considered those findings with respect to the following three classes of
witnesses:
A. Witnesses never imprisoned for genocide;
B. Witnesses imprisoned for genocide but released before trial; and
C. Witnesses imprisoned for genocide and still detained at trial.
Table 14 presents the results of the simple regressions. It shows an overall
decline in the Trial Chambers' positive credibility and reliability findings
over time for all three categories of witnesses. However, declines for the two
groups of imprisoned witnesses were much more substantial than for the
never-imprisoned witnesses. We cannot be as certain about the findings re-
garding the never-imprisoned witnesses because some of them were not sta-
tistically significant, but the data does clearly show (1) that the Trial
Chambers' confidence in the testimony of imprisoned witnesses declined
dramatically during the course of the ICTR's life; and (2) that its confidence
in the testimony of never-imprisoned witnesses did not change nearly as
98
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much. '1 7 Finally, the most notable finding, perhaps, stems from a compari-
son of the Trial Chambers' treatment of those who were imprisoned but
released and those who remained imprisoned at the time of their testimony.
That comparison shows that the decline in the Trial Chambers' positive
credibility and reliance findings was-counterintuitively-much steeper for
the witnesses who were imprisoned but released before trial than for wit-
nesses who were still detained at trial. Part V will discuss this surprising
result in more detail.
117. Although some of the findings with respect to never-imprisoned witnesses were not statistically
significant, they were close. More importantly, the 95 percent confidence intervals surrounding these
findings provide assurance that the Trial Chambers' treatment of the testimony of never-imprisoned
witnesses did not change at the rate that it did for imprisoned witnesses.
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D. The Interaction Between Credibility, Reliability, and Serious Inconsistencies
Because there is reason to believe that the testimonial deficiency most
likely to impair accurate fact-finding is serious inconsistency, it is particu-
larly important to probe the way in which the Trial Chambers' actual fact-
finding is influenced by serious inconsistency. Subsection 1 considers the
same question that we have been exploring in all of the sections in this Part,
namely, the Trial Chambers' positive credibility and reliability findings.
However, instead of categorizing our population of witnesses by gender or
ethnicity, for example, subsection 1 categorizes the witnesses by whether
their testimony contains a serious inconsistency or not. Next, subsection 2
asks a more targeted question: when are Trial Chambers willing to rely spe-
cifically on testimony that was seriously inconsistent with previous state-
ments/testimonies in order to find a fact beyond a reasonable doubt? Finally,
subsection 3 explores the public representation of the Trial Chambers' treat-
ment of serious inconsistencies by examining their willingness to mention
such inconsistencies in their judgments.
1. The Trial Chambers' Assessments of Witness Testimony with Serious
Inconsistencies
Table 15 shows that a much higher proportion of witnesses without seri-
ous inconsistences are found credible and reliable than witnesses with serious
inconsistencies.
TABLE 15: TRIAL CHAMBERS' CREDIBILITY AND RELIANCE FINDINGS BY
PRESENCE OF A SERIOUS INCONSISTENCY
Presence of
Serious
Inconsistency Credibility Relied Upon
% of Witnesses
% of Witnesses Whose
% of Witnesses Whose Testimony was
% of Witnesses Found Wholly Testimony was Wholly or
Found Wholly or Partially Wholly Relied Partially Relied
Credible Credible Upon Upon
Witnesses
with Serious 41% 50% 20% 45%
Inconsistencies
Witnesses
without 84% 89% 50% 68%
Serious
Inconsistencies
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The results of the tabular data are confirmed by a logit regression that
includes serious inconsistencies as one of a comprehensive set of explanatory
variables. In particular, the regression revealed that, if all other variables are
fixed at their average levels, witnesses who testify seriously inconsistently
are 44 percent less likely to be found totally credible"" and 35 percent less
likely to be found totally or partially credible than witnesses who do not
testify seriously inconsistently."'9 Similarly, Trial Chambers were 33 percent
less likely to totally rely on the testimony of a witness with a serious incon-
sistencyl20 and 35 percent less likely to totally or partially rely on the testi-
mony of a witness with a serious inconsistency.121
Graphs 18 through 21 depict the Trial Chambers' credibility and reliabil-
ity assessments over time for witnesses with and without serious
inconsistencies.
GRAPH 18: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
BY SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES OVER TIME
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118. See Marginal Effects of Serious Inconsistencies on the Trial Chambers' Total Credibility Findings,
infra app. 3.
119. See Marginal Effects of Serious Inconsistencies on the Trial Chambers' Total and Partial Credibil-
ity Findings, infra app. 4.
120. See Marginal Effects of Serious Inconsistencies on the Trial Chambers' Total Reliance Findings,
infra app. 5.
121. See Marginal Effects of Serious Inconsistencies on the Trial Chambers' Total and Partial Reliance
Findings, infra app. 5.
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GRAPH 19: SHOWING CHAMBERS' TOTAL AND PARTIAL CREDIBILITY
FINDINGS BY SERIOUS INCONSISTENCY OVER TIME
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GRAPH 20: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL RELIANCE ON WITNESS
TESTIMONY BY SERIOUS INCONSISTENCY OVER TIME
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GRAPH 21: SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' TOTAL OR PARTIAL RELIANCE
ON WITNESS TESTIMONY BY SERIOUS INCONSISTENCY
OVER TIME
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Running some simple regressions allows us to compare the Trial Cham-
bers' treatment of these two groups of witnesses over time, and they show
dramatic differences when it comes to credibility findings. In particular, the
regression suggests that the Trial Chambers' positive credibility findings for
witnesses without serious inconsistencies stayed virtually the same through
the course of the cases in the dataset, though that result is not statistically
significant. At the same time, the regressions show a marked decline over
time in the Trial Chambers' positive credibility findings for witnesses with
serious inconsistencies. Specifically, the Trial Chambers' positive credibility
findings, both total and partial, for witnesses with serious inconsistencies
declined by an average of just under 5 percent per year. 1 2 2
The regressions examining the Trial Chambers' reliability findings for
witnesses with and without serious inconsistencies present a murkier pic-
ture. For instance, the Trial Chambers' willingness to totally rely on witness
testimony appeared to decline at an equal average rate of 1.9 percent per
year for both sets of witnesses; however, that result is statistically significant
only for witnesses without serious inconsistencies. When it comes to the
Trial Chambers' willingness to rely in whole or in part on witness testi-
mony, the same divergence seen in the Trial Chambers' credibility findings
is again present. That is, the Trial Chambers' willingness to rely in whole or
122. Simple Regression Statistics for Credibility and Reliance Findings Over Time by Serious Incon-
sistencies in Testimony, infra app. 6.
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part on witnesses with serious inconsistencies declined at a much greater
rate, namely an average of 3.4 percent per year compared with an average of
only 0.6 percent per year for witnesses without serious inconsistencies. How-
ever, only the result for witnesses with serious inconsistencies was statisti-
cally significant.1 23
2. Trial Chambers' Specific Reliance on Seriously Inconsistent Testimony
Throughout this Article, I have presented data on the Trial Chambers'
reliance on witness testimony, but until now, when assessing a Trial Cham-
ber's willingness to rely on a particular witness's testimony, I took account
of the Trial Chamber's treatment of all of the witness's testimony. This sec-
tion also examines the Trial Chambers' reliance on witness testimony, but it
asks a more targeted question. For this section, I considered only witnesses
whose testimony contained serious inconsistencies, and I asked: for what
percentage of such witnesses did the Trial Chambers rely specifically on the
seriously inconsistent testimony in order to find the relevant fact? Tabular
data shows the answer to that question to be 33 percent.
Graph 22 below shows how the Trial Chambers' reliance on seriously
inconsistent testimony has changed over time. The graph shows a clear de-
cline in the Trial Chambers' willingness to rely on seriously inconsistent
testimony, and a simple regression confirms that decline. In particular, the
Trial Chambers' reliance on seriously inconsistent testimony declined by a
statistically significant average of 1.4 percent per year.1 24
123. Id.
124. Simple Regression 6: Trial Chamber's Reliance on Testimony with Serious Inconsistency to Find
Facts, infra app. 2.
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GRAPH 22: CHRONOLOGICALLY SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' RELIANCE
ON SERIOUSLY INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY
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3. Trial Chambers' References to Serious Inconsistencies in their Judgments
Although ICTR judgments are very lengthy and typically include a de-
tailed description of each witness's testimony, 1 25 they do not always mention
serious inconsistencies. 1 2 6 In particular, my dataset reveals that Trial Cham-
bers mention about 75 percent of serious inconsistencies in their judg-
ments. 12 7 Again, however, the data shows a fascinating time trend. As
Graph 23 clearly shows, Trial Chambers' references to serious inconsistencies
increased over time. Indeed, a simple regression produced the statistically
significant finding that references to serious inconsistencies increased an av-
erage of 1.6 percent per year. 1 2 8
125. ICTR judgments in single-defendant cases typically run at least 100 pages and often run several
hundred pages.
126. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 180 & n.796 (containing examples).
127. Specifically, Trial Chambers mentioned 72.22 percent of serious inconsistencies and failed to
mention 21.53 percent. For the remaining 5.56 percent of witnesses with serious inconsistencies, the
Trial Chamber mentioned at least one of the inconsistencies but failed to mention at least one.
128. Simple Regression 7: Trial Chamber's References to Serious Inconsistences in Judgments Over
Time, infra app. 3.
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GRAPH 23: CHRONOLOGICALLY SHOWING TRIAL CHAMBERS' REFERENCES
TO SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES IN JUDGMENTS
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V. SUMMARIZING AND EXPLAINING THE FINDINGS
The findings detailed in Parts III and IV provide interesting insights into
international criminal fact-finding that I will explore here. Section A sum-
marizes those findings and section B explains them.
A. Summarizing the Findings
I begin with the findings on serious inconsistencies. Although, as a gen-
eral matter, I did very little quantifying in Fact-Finding Without Facts, I did
make some effort to quantify serious inconsistencies. In particular, I ex-
amined six ICTR cases and three SCSL cases, 1 2 9 and I found that, on average,
approximately 50 percent of witnesses in those cases testified seriously in-
consistently with their previous statements/testimonies.1 3 0 For this study, I
constructed a far larger database. Yet, interestingly, it produced very similar
results: 48 percent of prosecution witnesses testified seriously inconsistently.
The incidence of serious inconsistencies varied, sometimes dramatically,
with the case. Defense counsel in Munyakazi, for instance, failed even to
mention witness statements for more than 70 percent of the prosecution
witnesses; therefore, it came as no surprise that I identified serious inconsis-
tencies in the testimony of only 9 percent of prosecution witnesses. By con-
trast, in Setako, Nzabonimana, and Ndahimana nearly three-quarters of
prosecution witnesses' testimony contained serious inconsistencies. Al-
though the case-by-case incidence of serious inconsistencies did vary, that
129. The three SCSL cases were the only SCSL cases in trial at the time I did my research, so my
findings with respect to those cases encompassed all of the SCSL data then in existence.
130. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 118-22.
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variation did not produce a statistically significant increase or decrease in
the incidence of serious inconsistencies over the course of the ICTR's life.
However, the data does show time trends for some subcategories. For in-
stance, as time passed, the incidence of serious inconsistencies with previous
ICTR testimony decreased while the incidence of serious inconsistencies
with Rwandan court statements/testimonies increased. The incidence of seri-
ous inconsistencies with ICTR pre-trial statements remained constant.
The data also shows that a host of witness characteristics had no statisti-
cally significant effect on the likelihood that the witness would testify seri-
ously inconsistently. For instance, although tabular data showed that a
higher proportion of male witness testimony contained serious inconsisten-
cies than did female witness testimony and that a higher proportion of Hutu
witness testimony contained serious inconsistencies than did Tutsi witness
testimony, those effects disappeared in a regression that took account of
other relevant factors. When it came to the intersection of gender, ethnicity,
and serious inconsistencies, the only statistically significant finding was that
Hutu women were more likely to testify seriously inconsistently than any
other gender-ethnic combination. The fact that a witness had been an ac-
complice of the defendant or had been imprisoned for a genocide crime also
had no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of serious inconsisten-
cies in that witness's testimony. By contrast, some details surrounding the
previous statements/testimonies themselves did prove statistically signifi-
cant. In particular, the number of statements/testimonies that a witness pro-
vided was a very strong predictor of serious inconsistencies, though the
length of time between the statement/testimony and the subject testimony
was not. Finally, the data showed that witnesses were more likely to testify
seriously inconsistently with statements/testimonies that had been submit-
ted to Rwandan courts, and to a lesser extent gacaca courts, than with other
statements/testimonies.
When it comes to the Trial Chambers' assessments of witness testimony,
my research reveals two particularly notable, and heartening, findings. The
first is that Trial Chambers became less likely to find prosecution witnesses
credible or to rely on their testimony over the course of the ICTR's life. The
second is that Trial Chambers were considerably less likely to find witnesses
credible or to rely on their testimony when the testimony of those witnesses
contained serious inconsistencies. This latter finding is notable because no
other witness characteristic proved a statistically significant predictor of
Trial Chamber credibility and reliability determinations. Specifically, the
data showed no statistically significant effect for gender, ethnicity, gender
and ethnicity in combination, accomplice status, or imprisonment status. By
contrast, a witness whose testimony had a serious inconsistency was 44 per-
cent less likely to be found totally credible and 33 percent less likely to have
all of his testimony relied upon than was a witness with all the same charac-
teristics whose testimony did not contain a serious inconsistency. Although
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these findings clearly suggest that Trial Chambers' assessments of witness
testimony are appropriately influenced by the presence of serious inconsis-
tencies, the data also showed that for about one-third of witnesses with seri-
ous inconsistencies, the Trial Chambers nonetheless relied on the seriously
inconsistent testimony to find the fact in question. In addition, for about
one-quarter of the witnesses with serious inconsistencies, the Trial Chambers
never even mentioned the inconsistencies in their judgments.
A decline in the Trial Chambers' willingness to credit witnesses or rely on
their testimony occurred across virtually all subpopulations of witnesses in
the dataset. However, that decline was far more dramatic for some popula-
tions than others. These included male witnesses, Hutu witnesses, witnesses
imprisoned for genocide, and witnesses with serious inconsistencies in their
testimony. Finally, the data shows a decline over time in the Trial Cham-
bers' willingness to rely on seriously inconsistent testimony to find facts.
Relatedly, the data shows an increase over time in the Trial Chambers' will-
ingness to mention serious inconsistencies in their judgments.
B. Understanding the Findings
International criminal law has its share of critics, and my previous fact-
finding work placed me among them. However, the data resulting from this
larger-scale and more rigorous empirical study tells a more nuanced and a
more heartening story. The data depicts an international criminal justice
system that, throughout its life, confronted a constant stream of serious tes-
timonial deficiencies. There was once reason to believe that the incidence of
these deficiencies would decline over time, and the fact that they did not
provides clues as to their causes. What did decline, however, was the Trial
Chambers' willingness to credit prosecution witnesses and rely on their tes-
timony. Indeed, the data arguably depicts an international criminal justice
system that, over time, strengthened its commitment to factual accuracy
and, more broadly, to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for
convictions.
1. Understanding Serious Inconsistencies
Because serious inconsistencies stand as the most challenging testimonial
deficiency in international criminal law-a realm featuring no shortage of
challenging testimonial deficiencies-it is important to learn what we can
about the factors that predict them. What my data suggests, however, is
that not a lot of factors do predict them. Certainly, the one statistically
significant finding-that witnesses who provide more pretrial statements/
testimonies are more likely to testify seriously inconsistently-is one that
common sense might lead us to expect. However, other expectations, which
might seem equally grounded in common sense, were not supported by the
data. For instance, although I was not surprised to learn that neither ethnic-
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ity nor gender predicted serious inconsistencies, I did expect that imprison-
ment status and accomplice status would. My expectation stemmed from the
fact that Rwandan courts and gacaca courts offer leniency to defendants who
confess their crimes, but in order for a confession to "count," as it were, the
defendant must inculpate other offenders.' 3 Thus, because Rwandan and
gacaca courts provide significant incentives for naming other offenders, many
commentators believe that imprisoned defendants falsely accuse others of
genocide.13 2 Assuming that is true, and reasoning that false testimony is
more likely to contain serious inconsistencies than truthful testimony, I ex-
pected the rate of serious inconsistencies to be higher among witnesses im-
prisoned for genocide than among witnesses who were not. However, the
logit regression did not support my expectation. One possible explanation
for this finding is that imprisoned witnesses on average submitted nearly
twice the number of statements/testimonies as non-imprisoned witnesses
did."' Because the number of documents submitted is a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of serious inconsistencies, perhaps the effect of imprisonment
status is felt indirectly through the number of documents submitted.
That said, even some of the tabular data regarding the relationship be-
tween serious inconsistencies and imprisonment status proved surprising.
The tabular data did show that non-accomplice and non-imprisoned wit-
nesses had lower rates of serious inconsistencies than accomplice and impris-
oned witnesses, as expected, but it also showed that witnesses who were
imprisoned at the time of trial had lower rates of serious inconsistencies than
did witnesses who had been imprisoned but released before trial. Those sta-
tistics are counterintuitive if we assume that false testimony is more likely
to contain serious inconsistencies. That assumption leads us to expect that a
greater proportion of witnesses who were imprisoned at trial would testify
falsely than would witnesses who were already released, because currently
imprisoned witnesses would seek leniency through false accusations, whereas
witnesses who had already been released would have nothing to gain.
Given that the data does not support my expectations, we need to unpack
and more carefully scrutinize the assumptions underlying my expectations.
For instance, I assumed that witnesses who were imprisoned at trial were
131. CARINA TERTSAKIAN, LE CHATEAU: THE LIVES OF PRISONERS IN RWANDA 396-405 (2008);
JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA'S COMMUNITY BASED GACACA COURTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 47-48 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda051lwebwcover
.pdf.
132. See, e.g., TERTSAKIAN,supra note 131, at 412-13; Stacey M. Mitchell, Restorative justice, RPF Rule
and the Success of Gacaca, in TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION 255, 263
(Henry F. Carey & Stacey M. Mitchell eds., 2013); Lars Waldorf, MassJustice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking
LocalJustice as TransitionalJustice, 79 TEMPLE L. REv. 1, 72-73 (2006); Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of
Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 125, 137
(2008).
133. Witnesses who were not imprisoned provided an average of 1.44 statements per witness, whereas
witnesses who were currently imprisoned or imprisoned but released provided averages of 3.44 and 3.7
statements/testimonies per witness, respectively.
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more likely to testify falsely than other witnesses, but that may not be true.
Certainly, some imprisoned witnesses had powerful incentives to falsely in-
culpate ICTR defendants, but some Tutsi victims did as well. Indeed, many
of the most well known allegations of perjury at the ICTR have centered on
Tutsi victims groups whose members allegedly encouraged other members
to falsely accuse ICTR defendants.134 Moreover, even if it is true that im-
prisoned witnesses were more likely to testify falsely than non-imprisoned
witnesses, that does not necessarily mean that their false testimony was more
likely to contain serious inconsistencies. Although the presence of a serious
inconsistency may be a predictor of false testimony, the reverse may not be
true. Indeed, it is possible that perjuring witnesses-and particularly perjur-
ing witnesses who are lying in order to receive tangible and substantial ben-
efits-take greater care than truthful witnesses to keep their representations
consistent.' Finally, at least with respect to the tabular data, the counter-
intuitive statistics may stem from the small sample size of witnesses who
were imprisoned but released before trial. Whereas the dataset included 264
witnesses who had never been imprisoned and fifty-two witnesses who were
imprisoned at trial, it included only twenty witnesses who had been impris-
oned but released before trial.
Although witness characteristics are not generally predictive of serious
inconsistencies, certain characteristics of pre-trial statements/testimonies are.
I explored three: (1) the number of statements/testimonies that a witness
submitted; (2) the length of time between the statements/testimonies and
the subject ICTR testimony; and (3) the type of statements/testimonies that
a witness submitted. As for the number of witness statements/testimonies,
the logit regression showed that the more statements/testimonies a witness
provided, the greater the likelihood that the witness's subject testimony
would be seriously inconsistent with at least one of the statements/testimo-
nies. As for the length of time between pretrial statements/testimonies and
subject testimony, the data shows no correlation. Indeed, tabular results
suggest that ICTR testimony is just as likely to be seriously inconsistent
with a statement that is more than thirteen years old as with a statement
134. See, e.g., Transcript of Continued Trial at 34, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., (Mar. 13, 2003)
(ICTR-99-52-T) (describing IBUKA as "a tiny group of Tutsis responsible for bringing false accusations,
fabricated accusations against people"); Transcript of Continued Trial at 93-96, Prosecutor v. Nahimana
et al., (Sept. 11, 2001) (ICTR-99-52-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 15-19, Prosecutor v.
Nahimana et al., (Jan. 20, 2003) (ICTR-99-52-T) (witness RMI0 maintaining that members of IBUKA
promised her more than $2000 plus benefits in the criminal case pending against her in exchange for
false testimony against the defendant). Indeed, Filip Reyntjens, a Belgian professor who has repeatedly
testified before the ICTR, described the victims' group IBUKA as a blackmailing syndicate. Transcript
of Continued Trial at 135-36, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Nov. 24, 1997) (ICTR-96-3-T).
135. Certain research suggests this possibility. See Vredeveldt, et al., supra note 47, at 184. See also
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 00-55A-T, Judgment, para. 14 (Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter
Muvunyi Judgment] (observing that "(wlhen an accomplice witness testifies in accordance with a prior
statement implicating the accused, a Trial Chamber must be mindful that the witness may have had a
motive or incentive to implicate the accused when he gave the prior statement, even if he has already
been sentenced or has served his sentence").
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that is less than one year old.'3 6 Turning finally to the type of statements/
testimonies that witnesses submitted, the data shows that Rwandan court
statements/testimonies were most likely to give rise to a serious inconsis-
tency, followed in descending order by gacaca statements/testimonies, ICTR
statements, ICTR testimony, and finally foreign court statements/testimo-
nies. In some cases, the differences were dramatic. For instance, nearly twice
the percentage of Rwandan court statements/testimonies (42 percent) gave
rise to serious inconsistencies as foreign court statements/testimonies (22
percent), and Rwandan court statements/testimonies were also considerably
more likely to give rise to serious inconsistencies than ICTR pre-trial state-
ments (31 percent).
At first glance, the latter two findings might appear counterintuitive. We
might expect testimony to be more likely to be seriously inconsistent with
older statements/testimonies than with newer ones because empirical studies
of witness testimony show that memories of events fade over time.3 7 Moreo-
ver, we might expect ICTR statements to give rise to a larger percentage of
serious inconsistencies than Rwandan court or gacaca statements/testimonies
because the former are apt to contain more errors than the latter. ICTR
investigators were almost certainly less informed than their Rwandan coun-
terparts about the subjects of their investigations. 13  Interviews conducted
by John Jackson and Yassin Brunger, for instance, revealed that early ICTR
statements, in particular, were apt to feature inaccuracies because investiga-
tors did not understand the information they were being provided.SE For
example, Jackson and Brunger reported that ICTR investigators "often
failed to be culturally sensitive . . . 'blundering in', as one respondent de-
scribed it, by asking a series of inappropriate questions that could upset
people."1 4 0 Because Rwandan investigators understood the culture and the
context, we might expect their statements to feature fewer inaccuracies. An-
other reason to expect fewer mistakes in Rwandan court and gacaca state-
ments/testimonies is because they are taken in the witnesses' native
language; ICTR interviews, by contrast, went through at least two rounds of
136. See Table 8.
137. See JOHN W. SHEPHERD ET AL., IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
80-86 (1982) (describing authors' study, which showed that memory remained relatively constant for a
few months after an event but declined sharply after eleven months); Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of
Face Memory, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 12, 23-25 (Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (summarizing research).
138. NICOLA PALMER, COURTS IN CONFLICT: INTERPRETING THE LAYERS OF JUSTICE IN POST-GE-
NOCIDE RWANDA 70-71 (2015) (observing that "sets of [ICTRJ investigators unfamiliar with the
Rwandan context and heavily dependent on translation were operating in the harrowing reality of post-
genocide Rwanda").
139. John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Fragmentation and Harmonization in the Development of
Evidentiary Practices in International Criminal Tribunals, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
159, 173-74 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014).
140. Id. at 174.
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language translations. 14 1 Indeed, ICTR statements were drafted in English
or French, so witnesses could not read the original versions before signing
off on them.
These findings are counterintuitive, however, only if one assumes that
serious inconsistencies result from innocent causes such as memory lapses or
investigatory errors. Certainly, if a sizeable proportion of serious inconsisten-
cies stemmed from witnesses' failure at the time of trial to remember the
details that they knew at the time they gave their statements, then the inci-
dence of serious inconsistencies would rise as the length of time between the
statements/testimonies and the subject testimony grew. Similarly, if a sizea-
ble proportion of serious inconsistencies was caused by investigators, who
made mistakes when drafting witness statements, then ICTR statements
would generate the largest proportion of serious inconsistencies, not
Rwandan court statements/testimonies. To be sure, these innocent explana-
tions can and almost certainly do cause some inconsistencies, but the find-
ings described suggest that they do not drive a large percentage of them.
This is an important insight because the most pressing question concern-
ing serious inconsistencies is not the who, the what, the where, or the when,
but the why. Certainly, it is interesting to learn whether male witnesses
testify seriously inconsistently at a greater rate than female witnesses, or
whether early ICTR cases featured more serious inconsistencies than later
cases. But what is truly valuable is to learn why witnesses testify seriously
inconsistently. To be sure, serious inconsistencies present serious challenges
to accurate fact-finding whatever their cause, but different causes give rise to
different remedies and more importantly, different Trial Chamber responses.
For instance, if we believe that most serious inconsistencies result from in-
vestigatory errors, as so many witnesses claim,1 4 2 then Trial Chambers
should typically credit witnesses' in-court testimony, and prosecutors should
take steps to improve the statement-taking process, perhaps by training in-
vestigators more thoroughly and ensuring better translation during the in-
terviews. Those responses are not so appropriate, however, if we think that
most inconsistencies arise because witnesses purposely tell different stories at
different times.
141. Typically investigators ask questions in English or French, and the questions are interpreted into
Kinyarwanda. The witness's answers-in Kinyarwanda-then must be interpreted back to English or
French. See, e.g., Akayesu Judgment, supra note 15, at para. 145; Alexander Zahar, The ICTR's Media
judgement and the Reinvention of Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide, 16 CRIM. L. FORUM 33, 41 n.26
(2005).
142. See, e.g., Niyitegeka Judgment, supra note 15, at paras. 59, 165; Gacumbitsi Judgment, supra
note 58, at para. 160; Transcript of Continued Trial at 33-35, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (July 19, 2001)
(ICTR-98-44A-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 24-25, Prosecutor v. Seromba (Oct. 6, 2004)
(ICTR-01-66-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 24-2 5, Prosecutor v. Seromba (Oct. 6, 2004) (ICTR-
01-66-T); Transcript of Continued Trial at 3, Prosecutor v. Seromba (Oct. 11, 2004) (ICTR-01-66-T);
Transcript of Continued Trial at 11, Prosecutor v. Seromba (Oct. 13, 2004) (ICTR-01-66-T); Transcript
of Continued Trial at 55, Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Apr. 19, 2004) (ICTR-95-1B-T).
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Indeed, if we assume that the majority of serious inconsistencies is caused
by witnesses purposely telling different stories at different times, then my
findings are not counterintuitive at all. For instance, we might suppose that
translation errors and investigator errors do cause some inconsistencies, but
because those errors are apt to be somewhat random, the inconsistencies they
cause are not so likely to be deemed "serious." In addition, a far greater
proportion of witnesses who provided Rwandan court statements had been
imprisoned for genocide than the witnesses who provided ICTR state-
ments.1 43 As noted, a witness's imprisonment status is not by itself predic-
tive of serious inconsistencies, but combining that status with the criminal
justice system in which the statement was taken could tell a different story.
In particular, witnesses accused of genocide in Rwandan courts not only had
incentives to falsely accuse ICTR defendants, but also to craft their stories so
as to minimize their own responsibility. Trial Chambers regularly suspected
imprisoned witnesses of engaging in such manipulations,1 4 4 and if their sus-
picions were correct, the testimony of these witnesses could easily diverge
from their previous representations.
Finally, one of the study's most notable-and counterintuitive-findings
is also consistent with the hypothesis that a large proportion of serious in-
consistencies reflect purposefully false testimony. The notable finding is that
the incidence of serious inconsistencies remained constant throughout the
ICTR's life. The finding is counterintuitive because, by all accounts, investi-
gatory practices improved over time,145 so those improvements would be
143. Twenty-one percent of witnesses who provided ICTR pre-trial statements had been imprisoned
for genocide crimes, whereas 55 percent of witnesses who provided Rwandan courts statements/testimo-
nies had.
144. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 578 & n.1607 ("Given that Witness
CDL is still serving time in Rwanda for crimes related to the events of 1994, he could have personal
motivations to implicate the Accused while minimising his own role in the attacks."); Ndahimana Judg-
ment, supra note 58, at para. 244 ("As shown by the evidence in this case, the witness may have tried to
minimise his own role in events."); Setako Judgment, supra note 59, at para. 156 ("The potential, there-
fore, exists that the witness's testimony may be influenced by a desire to positively impact his circum-
stances in Rwanda or to shift blame to Secako either to minimize his own involvement or based on the
belief that Setako was behind his increased sentence."); Munyakazi Judgment, supra note 55, at para. 119
("[A]t earlier stages of the proceedings in Rwanda, the witness may have attempted to minimise his
involvement in the genocide."); id. at paras. 131, 309, 371, 420, 421; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No.
ICTR 2000-55A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 156 (Sept. 12, 2006).
145. Report on the Conference on International Criminal Justice, Assembly of States Parties, ICC-
ASP/6/INF-2, 42, 43 (Oct. 19, 2007); Jackson & Brunger, supra note 139, at 173-77. When the ICTY
and ICTR were created, no international crimes had been investigated for fifty years. Thus, at that time,
a cadre of competent professionals experienced in the investigation of mass atrocities did not exist. See
Hassan B. Jallow, Challenges of International Criminaljustice: The ICTR Experience, OBSERVATIONS AT THE
COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 25-27, 2004), http://
ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/colloquium0
4 /jailow.html (noting that the ICTR "did not
have the advantage of investigators with specialized capacity to investigate genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes as no such tribunals previously existed"); Jackson & Brunger, supra note 139, at
169 (noting that when the ICTY and ICTR were created, "the United Nations was an organization with
no previous experience in running criminal justice activities"). That cadre developed over the course of
the ICTR's life. Investigations practices probably improved, in addition, in response to the Trial Cham-
bers' increasing willingness to reject prosecution witness testimony that featured serious inconsistencies.
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expected to produce a decrease in serious inconsistencies. But again, such a
decrease would appear only if a large proportion of serious inconsistencies
resulted from investigator errors. That the incidence of serious inconsisten-
cies remained constant is yet another indication that investigatory errors did
not play a primary causal role in serious inconsistencies.
It goes without saying, first, that there is no one set of causes for all
inconsistencies, and second, that we will be unable to determine the causes
for most inconsistencies at an individual level. But it is possible that some
causes explain a sizeable proportion of serious inconsistencies, and I believe
that my data provides support for the view-frequently advanced by defense
counsel-that witness mendacity is a primary driver of serious inconsisten-
cies. Indeed, the findings discussed in the next section suggest that the Trial
Chambers came to largely the same conclusion.
2. Understanding the Trial Chambers' Assessments
Just as witness characteristics were not predictive of serious inconsisten-
cies, they likewise were not predictive of the Trial Chambers' credibility and
reliability findings. Neither gender nor ethnicity was predictive, and neither
accomplice nor imprisonment status was predictive. The latter finding was
unexpected because the Trial Chambers repeated-in judgment after judg-
ment-their recognition that accomplice and imprisoned witnesses had in-
centives to lie,1 46 and their practice of viewing the testimony of accomplice
and imprisoned witnesses "with caution." 4 7 My findings might suggest,
then, that the Trial Chambers' actions did not match their words. Indeed,
the testimony of accomplices was often crucial to the charges against the
defendant,148 so, to the extent that the Trial Chambers did not want to
acquit large numbers of defendants, they could have been motivated to rely
on the testimony of accomplice witnesses even though they ostensibly
viewed it with caution. At the same time, it is possible that the Trial Cham-
bers did in fact view the testimony of accomplice and imprisoned witnesses
146. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR 01-63-T, Judgment and Sentence para. 17
(Nov. 12, 2008); Renzaho Judgment, supra note 59, para. 166; Muvunyi Judgment, supra note 135, para.
14. The Appeals Chamber repeatedly highlighted the same concern. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka,
Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Judgment, para. 98 (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Niyicegeka Appeal Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR 01-63-A, Judgment para. 305 (Mar. 18, 2010) (hereinafter
Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR 02-78-A, Judgment
para. 181 (May 8, 2012).
147. For examples of judgments that use this phrase, see note 115.
148. See, e.g., Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 58, at paras. 1224-1225 (relying on accomplice
witness CNAA to find that the defendant accused bourgmestres of not supporting the killings of Tutsis and
warned that they would be replaced by Interahamwe); Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 183
(relying on accomplice witness CBR); id. at para. 472 (relying on accomplice witness CBR to find that
defendant was with Ndahimana when he asked the attackers to "start working"); Renzaho Judgment,
supra note 59, at para. 251 (relying on accomplice witnesses AWE and GIJ to find that the defendant had
ordered individuals to collect and distribute weapons); id. at para. 652 (relying on accomplice witness
BUO to conclude that the defendant ordered the Interabamwe to attack, and later, to stop the killings at
Sainte Famille on June 17).
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more skeptically, but that the testimony withstood the additional scrutiny.
Accomplice witness testimony may have seemed particularly reliable, for
instance, because accomplice witnesses often knew more than non-accom-
plice witnesses about the events in question, and specifically about the de-
fendant's conduct. For this reason, their testimony may have been given
greater weight. At the same time, accomplice witness testimony may have
seemed particularly reliable because accomplices had the time to create that
perception. For instance, some witnesses who were imprisoned together col-
luded to concoct false but consistent allegations. 1 4 9 Trial Chambers fre-
quently sought corroboration for accomplice witness testimony,"o but
allegations generated through collusion did corroborate one another, and
they thereby may have generated more positive credibility and reliability
findings than one would expect after a cautious review of the testimony.
The study's two most notable findings are also the two most heartening.
First, Trial Chambers were appreciably less likely to credit a witness or rely
on his testimony if that testimony contained a serious inconsistency. That
finding suggests that Chambers appropriately recognized that serious incon-
sistencies usually reflect unreliability and often mendacity. Second, the fact
that Trial Chambers became less willing to find witnesses credible and to
rely on their testimony as time passed reflects the same recognition.
When Trial Chambers manifest a statistically significant change in their
treatment of testimony, two explanations are possible. First, the change
might reflect a change in the quality of the testimony. Second, the change
might reflect a change in the Trial Chambers' assessment methods."' Turn-
ing to the first explanation, we can certainly point to changes that occurred
over the course of the ICTR's life that could have reduced the quality of
witness testimony. For example, my data shows that the ethnic composition
of witnesses changed over time. 15 2 In addition, in 2005, Rwanda began con-
ducting gacaca trials"1 3 that often addressed the same crimes at issue in
ICTR cases.15 4 Although these changes had the potential to reduce the qual-
ity of witness testimony, the data suggests that they did not. As already
reported, witness characteristics such as ethnicity were not statistically sig-
nificant predictors of serious inconsistencies or the Trial Chambers' testimo-
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence para. 131
(Feb. 25, 2004); Transcript of Continued Trial at 57-58, Prosecutor v. Karemera, (Apr. 10, 2008) (ICTR
98-44-T); see also Renzaho Judgment, supra note 59, at para. 166.
150. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 00-55A-A, Judgment, para. 131 (Aug. 29, 2008);
Nchamihigo Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, para. 47.
151. It is also possible that both explanations combined to produce the change; however, in this case,
this possibility is unlikely, as explained in the text.
152. The proportion of Tutsi witnesses declined by an average of approximately 2.2 percent per year.
153. Between 2002 and 2004, Rwanda conducted a pilot phase for gacaca. It began trials nationwide
in 2005. Justice Compromised, supra note 131, at 21-22.
154. Nicola Palmer reported that "since the nationwide implementation of gacaca in 2005, forty-
seven out of forty-nine ICTR cases have discussed evidence gathered by the gacaca courts." Palmer, supra
note 138, at 83.
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nial assessments, so there is no reason to think that a change in the ethnic
composition of witnesses would produce a change in the Trial Chambers'
credibility or reliability findings. As for gacaca proceedings, their most
likely effect would have been to increase the incidence of serious inconsisten-
cies. To be sure, the introduction of gacaca almost certainly increased the
average number of statements/testimonies that witnesses provided, and that
factor did correlate with an increased incidence in serious inconsistencies.
But the overall incidence of serious inconsistencies remained constant over
time, as did the proportion of imprisoned witnesses. So we have no basis for
believing that the introduction of gacaca led to a decline in the quality of
witness testimony.
Finding no evidence of a decline in the quality of witness testimony, we
must assume that testimonial quality remained relatively constant, but that
the Trial Chambers' attitude toward that testimony changed over time.
What might account for that attitude change? I believe it stemmed from a
combination of two forces, one largely external and the other largely inter-
nal. First, the change reflects the Trial Chambers' increasing awareness of
the problems associated with prosecution witness testimony. Second, the
change reflects a maturation process that included the ICTR but extended to
international criminal justice more broadly.
The first explanation posits that Trial Chambers became less willing to
rely on prosecution witness testimony as time passed because, as time
passed, Trial Chambers became increasingly aware that a non-trivial propor-
tion of prosecution witness testimony contained inaccuracies as well as lies.
During the earliest cases in my dataset, defense counsel were unable even to
set foot in Rwanda,115 so their ability to collect evidence that would cast
doubt on prosecution witness testimony was highly constrained. It should
come as no surprise, then, that Trial Chambers found virtually every prose-
cution witness in those early cases credible. As time went on, however, de-
fense counsel became better able to conduct investigations that called
prosecution witness testimony into serious question. At this same time that
ICTR defense investigations were producing more evidence of witness men-
dacity, the reports of genocide trials in Rwanda were telling a similar story.
Scholars and human rights organizations covering the trials reported a high
incidence of perjury,15 6 and the subsequent introduction of gacaca and the
extraordinary attention it generated'5 7 only increased awareness of false accu-
155. Thierry Cruvellier, Grass-Roots justice, INT'L JUST. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1999.
156. See Des Forges & Longman, supra note 35, at 66 n.37; Transcript of Continued Trial at 134,
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Nov. 24, 1997) (ICTR-96-3-T); see also Paul Willis, No Lawyers but Rwanda's
Village Courts Could Pass Death Sentence, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 9, 2006, http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/ 151525 5/No-lawyers-but-Rwandas-village-courts-
could-pass-death-sentence.html.
157. For a small sampling of the literature on gacaca, see, e.g., CLARK, supra note 77; PAUL CHRIS-
TOPH BORNKAMM, RWANDA'S GACACA COURTS (2012); TERTSAKIAN, supra note 131; Waldorf, supra
note 132; Sosnov, supra note 132.
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sations.158 The very fact that Rwandan courts, which were widely believed to
manifest a pro-conviction bias,15 9 acquitted more than 25 percent of defend-
ants 60 was itself compelling evidence that many Rwandans falsely accused
their compatriots. Finally, the publication of my book Fact-Finding Without
Facts also publicized testimonial deficiencies in general and false testimony
in particular.' 6 ,
Therefore, as time passed, Trial Chambers could not help but become
aware that at least some prosecution witnesses testified falsely.1 62 Awareness
does not always lead to action, but in this case, a variety of forces combined
to motivate Trial Chambers to alter their treatment of witness testimony in
light of their newfound awareness. One source of particularly compelling
motivation derived from the ICTR Appeals Chamber, which occasionally
overturned Trial Chamber factual findings that it considered insufficiently
supported 63 or insufficiently defended,' 64 and which issued judgments that
sought to guide Trial Chamber assessments of evidence. For instance, the
Appeals Chamber delineated factors that Trial Chambers should consider
when assessing accomplice witness testimony 65 and testimony containing
serious inconsistencies.1 6 6 The Appeals Chamber also admonished the Trial
Chambers to describe their consideration. As the Appeals Chamber stated in
Renzaho, "Trial Chambers cannot merely state that they exercised caution
when assessing the evidence of an accomplice witness, but must establish
that they in fact did so."' 6 7
These admonitions, and in particular their focus on accused and impris-
oned witnesses and witnesses with serious inconsistencies, may help to ex-
plain the more granular time trends revealed by my data. Recall that, over
time, Trial Chambers became less willing to rely on the testimony of all
subcategories of prosecution witnesses, but the trend was far more dramatic
for accomplice and imprisoned witnesses and witnesses with serious incon-
sistencies than for other groups. These trends are in keeping with the Ap-
158. See supra note 132.
159. Des Forges & Longman, supra note 35, at 60-62.
160. Id. at 59.
161. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 130-66.
162. See, e.g., Transcript of Continued Trial at 18-60, Prosecutor v. Karemera (Apr. 10, 2008) (ICTR-
98-44-T) (witness BTH recants inculpatory testimony that he provided in four cases); Thijs Bouwknegt,
Rwanda's Genocide Tribunal's Witness Hiding, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE, Oct. 2, 2008 (Govern-
ment II Witness GFA admitting that he falsely testified against ICTR defendants in exchange for release
from Rwandan prison); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 95-54A-T, paras. 330-332 (Jan. 22,
2004).
163. Muvunyi Judgment, supra note 15, paras. 125-133; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, supra note
146, at paras. 77, 314, 322, 326, 344, 355.
164. Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, supra note 146, at para. 143.
165. Id. at para. 47.
166. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Judgment, at para. 96 (July 9, 2004).
167. Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR 97-31-A, Judgment, at para. 420 (Apr. 1, 2011); see also
Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, supra note 146, at para. 47.
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peals Chamber's dicta as well as with the Trial Chambers' increasing
awareness of the prevalence of false testimony.
Finally, Finding Without Facts may also have played a role in motivating
Trial Chambers to take testimonial deficiencies more seriously. It was the
first publication to provide an in-depth look at the problematic features of
international criminal testimony and, more importantly, at the Trial Cham-
ber's treatment of that testimony. By criticizing the Trial Chambers for
adopting "a cavalier attitude toward testimonial deficiencies" and for fre-
quently basing "their convictions on deeply flawed testimony,"168 my book
may have hit a nerve and encouraged greater scrutiny of prosecution witness
testimony in the future.
Although I have little doubt that the ICTR's fact-finding evolution was
driven in large measure by the facts on the ground that I have just de-
scribed, I likewise have little doubt that the evolution also reflects the natu-
ral, and promising, maturation process of international criminal justice in
general and the ICTR in particular.169 The ICTR and ICTY began their
lives as weak and vulnerable institutions whose long-term survival was in
grave doubt.170 In those days, international criminal justice was an experi-
ment that many expected to fail.171 And no wonder. Initially, the Tribunals
were provided inadequate funding,1 72 inadequate enforcement tools, and in-
adequate political support. 75 The ICTR was particularly dependent on
Rwanda for access to crime sites and witnesses, 74 so it generally took care to
stay in the country's good graces.1 75 At the same time, the Tribunals bore all
168. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 189. In addition, I argued, "Trial Chambers
routinely discount the significance and potentially distortive effect of many testimonial deficiencies." Id.
at 199.
169. For an empirically grounded contention that the ICTR has sought to legitimate its work, see
Palmer, supra note 138, at 160-63.
170. See Ralph Zacklin, The Failings ofthe Ad Hoc Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541, 541 (2004)
(describing the "doubts and skepticism that greeted the . . . ICTY in 1993").
171. PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 43-52 (James Thomas Snyder trans., 2 0 0 4 );
Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 501-02 (1994).
172. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Lawyers Committee Re-
port on the ICTR and National Trials, at V(B) (1997).
173. See, e.g., Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International
Crimes, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 66-69 (2002).
174. Bernard A. Mona, The Early Challenges of Conducting Investigations and Prosecutions Before Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals, OBSERVATIONS AT THE COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 25-27, 2004), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/colloquium04/muna.htm.
175. See VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS 151-231;
CRUVELLIER, supra note 30, at 10-13; Jackson & Brunger, supra note 139, at 170. The ICTR's high level
of dependence on Rwanda became especially clear in 1999, after the Appeals Chamber dismissed with
prejudice the indictment of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and ordered him released after concluding that the
prosecution had violated Barayagwiza's right to be brought promptly before a judge following arrest.
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-17-AR72, Decision (Nov. 3, 1999). The Appeals Cham-
ber's decision outraged Rwanda to such a degree that it suspended all dealings with the ICTR and
refused to issue a visa to the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. PESKIN, supra at 177-85;
Franck Petit, Cameroonian Intrigues, INT'LJUST. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2001.Del Ponte asked the Appeals Cham-
ber to reconsider its decision, and she candidly acknowledged Rwanda's power over the Tribunal, when
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the hopes and dreams of human rights advocates who saw international
criminal justice as the new frontier in preventing mass atrocities.1 7 6
I have argued previously that the vulnerability that characterized the
Tribunals' early years influenced many of its early decisions, including its
procedural choices and defense counsel regulations.' 77 I suspect that early
vulnerability also played a role in the Trial Chambers' kindly treatment of
prosecution witness testimony. With significant hurdles to overcome and
even more significant expectations to fulfill, the early ICTR could not afford
to reject large quantities of prosecution witness testimony. Elsewhere, I have
explored the high costs of international criminal acquittals, 7 but during
the ICTR's early years, even the rejection of a substantial quantity of prose-
cution witness testimony would have proven extraordinarily costly. When
established courts reject large quantities of prosecution witness testimony,
the courts are lauded for their judicial independence. Had the early ICTY
and ICTR rejected large quantities of prosecution witness testimony, they
would have provoked a storm of criticism. It was bad enough that both
Tribunals were delivering slow and expensive justice. 79 At least they were
delivering justice. If, following a genocide that killed more than half a mil-
lion people, prosecutors showed themselves unable to collect evidence of a
sufficient quality to withstand Trial Chamber scrutiny, then commentators
likely would have called for the experiment in international criminal justice
to come to an end.
Not surprisingly, then, ICTR Trial Chambers' scrutiny became easy to
withstand. Commentators have observed that early ICTY and ICTR cases
she told the Chamber: "If I don't get cooperation from Rwanda, . . . I can first open the door at the
detention center and set them all free and then second I can close the door to my office because without
them I cannot do anything all." J. Coll Metcalf, An Interview with United Nations' Chief War Crimes
Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, INTERNEWS, Feb. 15, 2000. In response, the Appeals Chamber reinstated
Barayagwiza's indictment, and relations between the ICTR and Rwanda returned to normal. Prosecutor
v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-17-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsid-
eration (Mar. 31, 2000). For an insider's account of the case, see MOGHALU, supra note 10, at 101-23.
176. The Tribunals were considered the testing ground for a permanent international criminal court,
then under negotiation, see Geoffrey R. Watson, The Changing Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 871, 872 (2003), and the promise of interna-
tional justice was proclaimed by scholars and practitioners alike, see, e.g., Richard Goldstone, Conference
Luncheon Address, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (1997); Richard May & Marieke Wierda,
Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE
KIRK McDONALD 249, 252-53 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUS-
TICE 56 (2000); Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 9-10 (1998); Antonio Cassese, Reflections
on International CriminalJustice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1998); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses
to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83
(1996).
177. Combs, supra note 6, at 377-80.
178. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 228-34.
179. See, e.g., John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCE-
DURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 167, 170 (Richard May et al. eds.,
2001) ("One of the major criticisms levelled at the Tribunal is the length of trials."); Combs, supra note
173, at 90-94.
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often were "thinly investigated"8 0 and likely to be based on "weak evi-
dence."""' Professor and former prosecutor Alex Whiting has described the
way in which ICTY judges, who joined with prosecutors in desiring the
tribunals' success, provided prosecutors tremendous latitude to amend
charges and add evidence long after a defendant's arrest. 18 2 ICTR judges
were likewise lenient in that regard,18 3 and, as this study shows, in their
assessments of witness testimony. In early cases, deficiencies in prosecution
witness testimony were largely ignored.
In the intervening years, international criminal justice came a long way.
The ICTY and ICTR not only carried out their own mandates, but they also
paved the way for a host of new ad hoc tribunals as well as for a permanent
international criminal court.1 84 And as the tribunals themselves grew-from
novel and vulnerable institutions to the foundational bodies of the global
international criminal justice system-something very positive happened to
fact-finding at the ICTR. No longer confronting the threat of closure, ICTR
judges began to more carefully scrutinize prosecution witness testimony,
highlight its deficiencies, and reject substantial quantities of it. The judges'
increased awareness of false testimony combined with the enhanced credibil-
ity and legitimacy of their tribunal to enable ICTR judges to engage in
more scrupulous, defensible fact-finding.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Rosemary Byrne has observed, "Empirical research on international
criminal trials can lead to a recalibrating of assumptions about the interna-
tional criminal trial process, and in turn offer an informed basis upon which
to improve international trial practice."'8 " The empirical study described
here, though centering on the ICTR, has broad implications for interna-
tional criminal justice as a whole. For one thing, the current international
tribunals struggle with the same fact-finding impediments that made truth
so elusive at the ICTR. In particular, serious inconsistencies appear with
180. Whiting, supra note 13, at 137. Former ICTR Special Counsel and Spokesman Kingsley
Moghalu diplomatically conceded that the ICTR's prosecution "was frequently not 'trial-ready' before
obtaining arrest warrants . . . ." MOGHALU, supra note 10, at 193; see also Jallow, supra note 145 (noting
that "in the early years arrests and detention of suspects frequently preceded investigations").
181. Jenia Jontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48
VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 588 (2007-08).
182. Whiting, supra note 13, at 138.
183. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kabiligi & Ntabakuze, Case Nos. ICTR-97-34-I & ICTR-97-30-I, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor's Motion to Amend the Indictment (Oct. 8, 1999); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No.
ICTR-01-76-I, Decision on Motion to Amend Indictment (Jan. 26, 2004); Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo,
Case No. ICTR-01-73-I, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Leave to Amend Indictment and on De-
fence Urgent Motion for an Order to Disclose Supporting Material in Respect of the Prosecutor's Motion
for Leave to Amend the Indictment (Oct. 15, 2003).
184. See PALMER, supra note 138, at 60-61.
185. Rosemary Byrne, Drawing the Missing Map: What Socio-legal Research Can Offer to International
Criminal Trial Practice, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 991, 1006 (2013).
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alarming frequency in the transcripts of ICC1 16 and the Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia.1 8 7 Moreover, the fact that the incidence of
serious inconsistencies remained constant throughout the ICTR's life, de-
spite an increasing budget and a decreasing willingness on the part of Trial
Chambers to rely on such testimony, should motivate prosecutors at the
current tribunals to redouble their efforts to improve the quality of prosecu-
tion witness testimony. Even simple reforms to statement-taking could have
considerable impact. For instance, at present, many witness statements are
summaries of the information that the witness conveyed to the investigator.
Consequently, when a statement fails to contain an allegation that is central
to the witness's testimony, the witness can plausibly, but perhaps inaccu-
rately, explain the omission by claiming that he was never asked about the
allegation. At the very least, then, witness statements should be drafted in
transcript format so as to include both the investigator's questions as well as
the witness's responses. The Niyitegeka Appeals Chamber recommended this
very reform back in 2004,18 though it never became a consistent practice at
the ICTR. Indeed, this is the most minor of the measures that should be
186. Transcript of Trial Hearing at 32-34, Prosecutor v. Bemba (Feb. 24, 2011) (ICC-01/05-01/08-
T-73-Red-ENG); Transcript of Trial Hearing at 47-50, Prosecutor v. Bemba (Dec. 1, 2011) (ICC-01/05-
01/08-T-195-Red-ENG); Transcript of Trial Hearing at 23-24, Prosecutor v. Bemba (May 2, 2012)
(ICC-01/05-01/08-T-221-ENG); Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on
Defence Application for Judgments of Acquittal, paras. 53, 58 (Apr. 5, 2016); Antoine Panafte, Second
Gbagbo Witness: "They Aimed at the Mosque," INT'L JUST. MONITOR Feb. 10, 2016, http://www.ijmonitor
.org/2016/02/second-gbagbo-trial-witness-they-aimed-at-the-mosquel; Transcript of Trial Hearing at
67-68, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (Nov. 12, 2015) (ICC-01/04-02/06-T-48-Red-ENG); Wairagala
Wakabi, Ntaganda's Lauyers Cross-Examine Witness P790 in Closed Session, INT'L JUST. MONITOR Jan. 26,
2016, http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/01/ntagandas-lawyers-cross-examine-witness-p790-in-closed-ses-
sion/; Tom Maliti, Witness Says Promise of "Good Life" Induced False Claims, INT'L JUST. MONITOR Sept.
24, 2014, http://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/09/witness-says-promise-of-good-life-induced-false-claims/;
Jennifer Easterday, Katanga and Ngadjolo are Responsible for Attack on Bogoro, Victims Claim, INT'L JUST.
MONITOR Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.ijmonitor.org/2011/04/karanga-and-ngudjolo-are-responsible-for-
attack-on-bogoro-victims-claim/.
187. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 79-81, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav "Duch" (July 7, 2009)
(001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC); Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 35-39, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav
"Duch" (July 8, 2009) (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC); id. at 2-3, 61-62, 73-75; Transcript of Trial Pro-
ceedings at 49, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav "Duch" (Aug. 4, 2009) (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC);
Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 9-10, Prosecutor v. Kaing Gunk Eav "Duch" (Aug. 11, 2009) (001/
18-07-2007-ECCCITC); Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 87-89, Prosecutor v. Chea (Dec. 8, 2011)
(002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC); Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 8-10, 26-27, 62-64, Prosecutor v.
Chea (Apr. 10, 2012) (002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC); Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 40-41, Prosecutor
v. Chea (Apr. 19, 2012) (002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC); Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 63, Prosecutor
v. Chea (Feb. 3, 2016) (002/19-09-2007-ECCCITC). See also Seth Mydans, Torture and Death Recounted at
Cambodian Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009.
188. The Appeals Chamber stated that an "ideal" record of a witness interview would include "all the
questions that were put to a witness and all the answers given by the witness" along with "(t]he time of
the beginning and the end of an interview, specific events such as requests for breaks, offering and
accepting of cigarettes, coffee, and other events that could have an impact on the statement or its assess-
ment." Niyitegeka Appeal Judgment, supra note 146, at para. 31. The Appeals Chamber concluded that
it was "necessary to disclose the questions put to the witness in order to make the statement intelligible"
and to enable the defense "to prepare for cross-examination properly." Id at para. 33. Indeed, the Cham-
ber went so far as to maintain that "it may be impossible to assess the probative value of the witness's
answer without juxtaposing it with the relevant question." Id.
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considered.189 The ICTR's inability to reduce serious inconsistencies stands
as a warning to today's international tribunals to take testimonial deficien-
cies seriously.
The warning should be particularly ominous for the ICC because that
court faces far more profound fact-finding challenges than those the ICTR
confronted. The ICTR had twenty years to investigate one set of crimes in
one small nation that occurred over the course of 100 days. The ICC, by
contrast, must simultaneously investigate a series of crimes committed as
part of a series of long-term conflicts occurring in locations all over the
globe. ICC investigators will never have the luxury of familiarizing them-
selves with their subjects to the degree or depth that ICTR investigators
were able to. Further, the conditions greeting ICTR investigators were far
more secure and hospitable than ICC investigators can hope to enjoy. By the
time the ICTR was created, the conflict in Rwanda had ended, so ICTR
investigators could conduct their investigations without fear of violence. 190
To be sure, Rwanda and the ICTR have had their disagreements over the
years,191 but as a general matter, Rwanda approved of the ICTR's prosecu-
tions, and welcomed ICTR investigators into the country. 1 9 2 By contrast,
ICC investigators are unable even to enter some of the states where they
should be investigating crimes,193 and when they are able to conduct in-state
investigations, they, and prospective witnesses, frequently face such serious
security risks that they must work through intermediaries 1 94 and rely exces-
sively on reports drafted by the United Nations or non-governmental orga-
nizations. 195 Finally, although ICTR prosecutors regularly presented
witnesses whose testimonies diverged from their previous representations, at
least ICTR prosecutors could have confidence that their witnesses would
show up and would inculpate the defendants. Many ICC witnesses, by con-
trast, have been intimidated into recanting their allegations and refusing to
testify. 1 9 6 Indeed, the prosecution's failure to submit credible and reliable
189. For other suggested reforms, see FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 274-321.
190. The Rwandan conflict ended in July 1994, see I VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 58 (1997), and the ICTR was created in November
1994, see id. at 72.
191. As a member of the Security Council, Rwanda voted against the creation of the ICTR, see id. at
72, and it completely obstructed the Tribunal's efforts to prosecute members of the ruling Rwandan
Patriotic Front, see Victor Peskin, Victor's justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the
Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR, in REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AF-
TER MASS VIOLENCE 173, 173 (Scott Strauss & Lars Waldorf eds., 2011). Rwanda also believed the
Tribunal cost too much for the number of offenders it prosecuted. CLARK, supra note 77, at 136.
192. See ALISON DEs FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY":
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 1132 (1999).
193. Jackson & Brunger, supra note 139, at 171; Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to
be Learned from the Lubanga judgment, 11 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs 30, 50 (2013).
194. Id. at 70.
195. See id. at 54-56.
196. See, e.g., Public Redacted Version of "Prosecution's Request for the Admission of Prior Recorded
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evidence has already emerged as a crucial early challenge for the ICC. ICC
prosecutors have been the target of blistering criticism, most notably from
ICC judges,' 97 but also from commentators who have questioned the prose-
cution's "small team" approach to investigations,19  criticized its failure to
conduct more in-state investigations, 99 and urged it to adopt a more in-
formed approach to investigations. 200 This study, then, provides additional
and concrete support for those views. The very fact that serious inconsisten-
cies appeared in the testimony of approximately one-half of ICTR prosecu-
tion witnesses-throughout the ICTR's life, when ICTR prosecutors labored
under dramatically more favorable conditions-should serve as a wake-up
call to the ICC.
And a loud wake-up call it should be. ICC judges have already shown
unparalleled willingness to reject the prosecution's evidentiary offerings.
Unlike ICTR judges who initially called most doubts in favor of prosecution
witnesses, ICC judges have, from the court's very inception, required prose-
cutors to meet stringent evidentiary standards. In addition, they have
backed up those standards with real consequences. Not only have ICC
judges rejected large quantities of prosecution evidence in the two cases that
resulted in conviction, 20 1 they have refused to confirm charges in approxi-
mately one-third of the prosecution's cases, 202 and they have acquitted one
out of three defendants. 203 Some have suggested that the judges' evidentiary
requirements might be too exacting, 204 but what is clear is that ICC prose-
cutors have no choice but to devote considerable attention to the sorts of
testimonial deficiencies that ICTR prosecutors initially had the luxury to
ignore.
In fact, whereas the ICC prosecution should take to heart this study's
findings on testimonial deficiencies, the ICC judges need no lessons from
the ICTR on the treatment of witness testimony. I have argued that interna-
tional criminal justice matured tremendously during the years the ICTR
conducted trials, and the careful judicial scrutiny now on display at the ICC
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stands as a compelling testament to the newfound legitimacy and credibility
of the current international criminal justice system. As Julie O'Sullivan
wrote about the ICC, "{far from being a kangaroo court where verdicts of
'guilty' can be counted upon, the court is an entity where the prosecution is
viewed with a skeptical and sometimes even jaundiced eye." 205 Though dif-
ficult for the prosecution in the short run, O'Sullivan maintains that "talny
augmentation of the Court's perceived impartiality has the power to enhance
the credibility of each prosecutorial victory." 2 0 6
Back in 1994, the ICTY asserted that, "the success of the Tribunal as a
whole depends very much on the caliber of [the Prosecution's) investigative
staff." 207 That statement was not really true for the ICTR in its early years,
but it became true. By the end of its life, the ICTR's fact-finding had under-
gone a dramatic evolution, an evolution whose legacy the ICC is carrying on.
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